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Thirteen percent of the population of the United States is over the age of sixtyfive.1 Twenty-five percent of these sixty-five-year-olds will live past the age of
ninety, and ten percent will live past the age of ninety-five. 2 Unless
demographics change radically, by the year 2030 more than one-fifth of the
population of the United States will be over the age of sixty-five.3 While these
statistics seem salutary, they imply the stark reality complementing advanced
age: seventy percent of all aging citizens will need some form of long-term care,
and many will require nursing home assistance that can cost more than ninety
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1. LORAINE A. WEST, SAMANTHA COLE, DANIEL GOODKIND & WAN HE, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010 3 (2014), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/
Census/library/publications/2014/demo/p23-212.pdf.
2. Calculators: Life Expectancy, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/planners/life
expectancy.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2015).
3. WEST, COLE, GOODKIND & HE, supra note 1, at 5 tbl.1-1.
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thousand dollars each year based on estimates for 2015. 4 These costs will
continue to rise, especially in densely populated areas of the country where the
need for long-term care is the greatest.5 To meet the significant cost of longterm residential care, some persons—and their families—will self-pay from
family assets.6 An increasing number of persons will pay for care with newer
and more advantageous insurance policies formulated for long-term care,7 but a
significant number of Americans needing long-term care will depend upon
Medicaid to cover the cost.8
Medicaid is a joint federal-state partnership program enacted in 1965 to
provide medical care to the elderly, the blind, and the disabled poor. 9 The
federal financial contribution towards each state’s Medicaid expenses may not
be less than fifty percent or more than eighty-three percent.10 This program is
distinct from Medicare, a singular federal program providing medical care for
4. TREVOR TOMPSON, JENNIFER BENZ, JENNIFER AGIESTA, DENNIS JUNIUS, KIM NGUYEN
& KRISTINA LOWELL, THE ASSOC. PRESS-NORC CTR. FOR PUB. AFFAIRS RESEARCH, LONGTERM CARE: PERCEPTIONS, EXPERIENCES, AND ATTITUDES AMONG AMERICANS 40 OR OLDER 1
(2013), http://www.apnorc.org/PDFs/Long%20Term%20Care/AP_NORC_Long%20Term%20
Care%20Perception_FINAL%20REPORT.pdf; GENWORTH FIN., INC., COST OF CARE SURVEY
2015 17 (2015), https://www.genworth.com/dam/Americas/US/PDFs/Consumer/corporate/130
568_040115_gnw.pdf (estimating the median annual cost for a private room in a nursing home in
the United States).
5. See, e.g., Enrique Zamora, Deborah Nodar & Krista Ogletree, Long-Term Care
Insurance: A Life Raft for Baby Boomers, 26 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 79, 85 (2013) (“According to
the 2012 MetLife Market Survey of Nursing Home, Assisted Living, Adult Day Services, and
Home Care Costs, the average costs for varying levels of long-term care continue to increase.”)
(citing METLIFE MATURE MARKET INST., THE 2012 METLIFE MARKET SURVEY OF NURSING
HOME, ASSISTED LIVING, ADULT DAY SERVICES, AND HOME CARE COSTS 4 (2012), https://
www.metlife.com/assets/cao/mmi/publications/studies/2012/studies/mmi-2012-market-surveylong-term-care-costs.pdf); U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Assisted Living,
LONGTERMCARE.GOV,
http://longtermcare.gov/where-you-live-matters/living-in-a-facility/
assisted-living/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2015) (noting that assisted living costs “can be higher in urban
areas”).
6. See, e.g., Paying for Long-Term Care, NIH SENIOR HEALTH, http://nihseniorhealth.gov/
longtermcare/payingforlongtermcare/01.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2015) (“At first, many people
pay for long-term care services with their own money . . . [including] personal savings, a pension
or other retirement fund, income from stocks and bonds, or proceeds from the sale of a home.”).
7. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RISING DEMAND FOR LONG-TERM SERVICES AND
SUPPORTS FOR ELDERLY PEOPLE 28 (2013), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113thcongress-2013-2014/reports/44363-LTC.pdf (noting that while the number of people with longterm care insurance increased by approximately twelve percent from 1998 to 2005, growth has
slowed in recent years as “the age group most likely to purchase [long-term care insurance] . . .
reach[es] its peak as a share of the U.S. population”).
8. See, e.g., Michael Gilfix & Bernard A. Krooks, The High Cost of Aging, 151 TRS. & ESTS.
43, 43 (2012) (noting that Medicaid is “the primary payer” of long-term care in the United States).
9. Medicaid Information, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.socialsecurity.gov/disability
research/wi/medicaid.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2015).
10. ALISON MITCHELL & EVELYNE P. BAUMRUCKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42941,
MEDICAID’S FEDERAL MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PERCENTAGE (FMAP), FY2014 2 (2013),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42941.pdf.
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Americans over the age of sixty-five and for persons of any age qualifying as
disabled.11 Medicare is not dependent on qualifying as poor; anyone over the
age of sixty-five who is eligible to receive Social Security retirement benefits
may qualify for the program.12 In addition to eligibility requirements, there are
significant differences between Medicaid and Medicare. First, Medicare does
not pay for residential long-term care benefits whereas Medicaid will do so;
Medicare provides a limited reimbursement benefit for skilled nursing care and
then only for a specified period of time. 13 Second, Medicare is a federal
program, while Medicaid is a joint federal-state program, so states must make a
financial contribution, prompting greater state vigilance. 14 Third, Medicaid
eligibility requirements may vary among the states, but state rules are bound by
certain federal standards.15
Even though Medicaid provides medical services to an eligible recipient, the
focus of this Article will be premised on Medicaid’s payment for long-term care
for nursing homes, assisted living, or increasingly, in-home care. Because
Medicare will not pay for long-term care—but Medicaid will—millions of
persons in need of such care seek to “spend-down” income or assets in order to
qualify as sufficiently needy or poor. 16 Elder law attorneys and prescient
individuals have created masterful “spend down” plans that allow clients to
qualify as poor, thereby becoming eligible for Medicaid’s long-term care
benefits. 17 Once an individual qualifies, he or she can shift financial
responsibility to pay for the care from the individual recipient to state Medicaid
offices.18 The qualifications for eligibility became more relaxed when Congress
11. What’s Medicare?, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-change-plans/
decide-how-to-get-medicare/whats-medicare/what-is-medicare.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2015).
12. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SSA PUBL’N NO. 05-10043, MEDICARE 5 (2015), http://www.
socialsecurity.gov/pubs/EN-05-10043.pdf.
13. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CMS PROD. NO. 02174, YOUR GUIDE TO
CHOOSING A NURSING HOME OR OTHER LONG-TERM CARE 5 (2015), https://www.medicare.gov/
Pubs/pdf/02174.pdf.
14. VICTORIA WACHINO, ANDY SCHNEIDER & DAVID ROUSSEAU, KAISER COMM’N ON
MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, FINANCING THE MEDICAID PROGRAM: THE MANY ROLES OF
FEDERAL AND STATE MATCHING FUNDS 15‒17 (2004), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.
wordpress.com/2013/01/financing-the-medicaid-program-the-many-roles-of-federal-and-statematching-funds-policy-brief.pdf.
15. Eligibility,
MEDICAID.GOV,
http://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-programinformation/by-topics/eligibility/eligibilty.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2015) (explaining that state
eligibility criteria must conform with federal standards, but may expand coverage with a waiver
from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services).
16. See Roloff v. Sullivan, 975 F.2d 333, 337‒38 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing the income
spend-down process).
17. See April Rudin, Discussing LongTerm Family Care During Thanksgiving, ALL GLOBAL
NEWS ON ONE PAGE (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.allword-news.co.uk/2010/11/23/page/4.
18. See MARYBETH MUSUMECI, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE AFFORDABLE
CARE ACT’S IMPACT ON MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY, ENROLLMENT, AND BENEFITS FOR PEOPLE WITH
DISABILITIES 5 (2014), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/04/8390-02-theaffordable-care-acts-impact-on-medicaid-eligibility.pdf.
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provided for the protection of applicants’ spouses by permitting the shifting of
assets to protect marital property rights. 19 Protections allow the noninstitutionalized spouse to freeze marital assets for the duration of the lives of
both of the parties, thereby protecting the spouse against probable
impoverishment.20 But then, at the death of the latter of the two spouses, the
state may seek recovery of expenditures through estate recovery programs.21
Estate recovery is a nascent area of the law; this fact is reflected in the various
state statutes governing the process. 22 When Congress permitted spouses to
exempt certain assets to protect one or both of the spouses, it also specified that
states eventually could recover expenditures made.23 But while the states could
enact recovery procedures that did not exceed federal specifications, the states
have been slow to respond,24 and some states have seen their efforts stymied by
litigation over the interpretation of federal Medicaid legislation and threats of
preemption. 25 The issues raised in this Article suggest that there will be an
increasing number of cases throughout the United States. But states have no
recourse other than to become increasingly vigilant in pursuing private funds to
pay for Medicaid expenditures. Concomitantly, elderly citizens and their
families face uncertainty about what will become of family homes, annuities,
and other property pursued to pay for long-term care stretching back years and
perhaps decades.
This Article addresses three specific issues that have arisen concerning estate
recovery statutes and how federal and state interaction has resulted in
uncertainty among state courts, elder law attorneys, and persons seeking to
qualify for Medicaid long-term care payments. First, what constitutes an
“estate” for purposes of recovery of assets to pay for long-term care
expenditures? Second, if assets of a Medicaid recipient are transferred during
lifetime, thereby depriving the Medicaid recipient or the recipient’s spouse of an
interest in the asset at the time of death, is it permissible to trace the transferred
assets for estate recovery? And third, should an annuity purchased to provide
exempt income for a recipient’s spouse be considered a resource sufficient to
disqualify an applicant from Medicaid eligibility?
The three issues discussed in this Article have arisen as a result of federal
legislation. A brief legislative history will demonstrate the progression of
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(a)‒(d) (2012) (providing rules for the treatment of income of
institutionalized spouses). See also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., POLICY BRIEF #3,
SPOUSES OF MEDICAID LONG-TERM CARE RECIPIENTS 1‒2, 5, 7‒11 (2005), http://aspe.hhs.gov/
sites/default/files/pdf/74086/spouses.pdf.
20. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
21. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., POLICY BRIEF #1, MEDICAID ESTATE
RECOVERY 1‒2, 6‒7 (2005), http://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/74101/estaterec.pdf.
22. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
23. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
24. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., POLICY BRIEF #1, supra note 21, at 5.
25. See, e.g., Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785, 787‒89 (Idaho
2012) (addressing whether federal law preempted the state’s ability to recover from an estate).
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federal statutes and corresponding state regulations pertaining to estate recovery.
The judicial debate over the federal mandate and the corresponding state
statutory interpretations are relatively recent, and the three issues discussed in
this Article—although not isolated from other legal obscurities—are important
enough to long-term care planning to warrant scrutiny. More significantly, these
three issues suggest that more comprehensive legislation is needed to effectively
recover expenditures made from the estates of Medicaid recipients and their
spouses. The conclusion of this Article will offer suggestions as to how
Congress may modify sections of the Medicaid statute to better accommodate
issues arising at the state level. Congress needs to provide clarity to meet the
needs of the states and an expanding segment of the population.
I. HISTORY OF MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY FOR LONG-TERM CARE
Costs associated with care can be significant. 26 As one study points out,
“[f]ifty percent of individuals over 85 will need assistance with daily
functioning, and their home care can cost from $55,000 to $75,000 a year and
up to $180,000 annually for nursing home care.”27 Prior to the codification of
measures intended to protect spouses of institutionalized persons,28 whatever
assets were accumulated by a married couple were often exhausted after paying
for the care of one spouse, leaving the non-institutionalized spouse impoverished
in the event that he or she survived the institutionalized spouse.29 Incrementally,
federal legislation—beginning in 1988 with the Medicare Catastrophic
Coverage Act (MCCA) and most significantly revamped in 2005 with the
Deficit Reduction Act (DRA)—provided some protection to the noninstitutionalized spouse by exempting income and assets. 30 Eventually these
exempt assets became the subject of estate recovery programs seeking to recoup
expenditures made for an institutionalized spouse. 31 The programs were

26. Russell N. Adler, Peter J. Strauss & Regina Kiperman, America’s Long-Term Care Crisis,
152 TRS. & ESTS. 44, 44 (2013).
27. Id.
28. Medicaid defines an institutionalized spouse as someone who is married to a noninstitutionalized spouse and is likely to be in long-term care for at least thirty consecutive days. See
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(h)(1)(B) (2012).
29. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-37 (West 2015) (providing that spouses are
jointly liable to support their family and for specified expenses). The duty to provide necessaries
can prompt spouses to divorce. See Andrea B. Carroll, Incentivizing Divorce, 30 CARDOZO L. REV.
1925, 1926‒27 (2009).
30. See infra notes 55, 78 and accompanying text. “Asset” is often used interchangeably with
“resources” in relevant federal law; the Social Security Program Operations Manual System
(POMS) defines resources as “cash and any other personal property, as well as any real property,
that an individual (or spouse, if any): owns; has the right, authority, or power to convert to cash (if
not already cash); and is not legally restricted from using for his/her support and maintenance.”
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM § SI 01110.100, DISTINCTION
BETWEEN ASSETS AND RESOURCES (2015), https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0501110100.
31. See, e.g., infra note 108 and accompanying text.
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mandated by Congress and illustrated a common theme: that “Medicaid has
always been intended to be ‘the payer of last resort.’”32
Estate recovery programs originate with Medicaid’s eligibility requirements,
which are based on federal income and asset limits.33 To be considered poor and
thus entitled to Medicaid, the total value of the applicant’s assets, excluding
income, at the time of the application and throughout the time he or she is
receiving Medicaid benefits, cannot exceed $2,000 for an individual and $3,000
for a married couple when they both apply for benefits.34 Federal legislation
such as the DRA,35 and various regulations issued by the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid, affect these limits and specify penalties for violations of the
guidelines.36 Once an applicant is determined to be eligible for Medicaid longterm care benefits, Medicaid will seek to provide care in what is intended to be
the “least restrictive alternative” placement, such as assisted living or in-home
placement.37 States are permitted to offer a variety of long-term care placement
options as long as these options meet certain federal minimum standards.38
There are additional limits on what a state may recover from the estate of an
institutionalized recipient.39 First, notice of the estate recovery program must

32. See Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785, 788 (Idaho 2012) (quoting
Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 291 (2006)).
33. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., POLICY BRIEF #1, supra note 21, at 1. The
Department of Health and Human Services states:
Medicaid imposes stringent limits on income and assets of recipients, consistent with its
mission to provide a health care safety net for the poor and for those whose personal
resources are insufficient to pay the full cost of care. In order to fulfill this mission,
Medicaid also recovers expenses paid on behalf of recipients from their estates under
certain circumstances.
Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1382a(a) (2012) (defining categories of income). Income may be defined
as any cash or in-kind benefits that could conceivably enable the recipient to obtain food or shelter.
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1103 (2015). Not counted as income are items defined as medical care, needbased assistance, or income derived from other family members not available to the applicant. See
id.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(B).
35. See, e.g., id. § 1396p(c)(1) (modifying the look-back period and method of disqualifying
transfers made during this period).
36. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 435.2 (2015) (establishing Medicaid eligibility rules). See also
Letter from Dennis G. Smith to State Medical Director, Ctrs. for Medicaid & Medicare Servs., U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (July 27, 2006), http://www.medicaid.gov/Federal-PolicyGuidance/downloads/SMD072706b.pdf.
37. Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 602 n.18 (1999). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a), (e),
(f) (2012) (allowing waivers from Medicaid requirements to be obtained); Waivers,
MEDICAID.GOV,
http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/
Waivers/Waivers.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2015).
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A).
39. See generally id. § 1396a(a)(18) (specifying that state plans must comply with provisions
of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p).

2015]

Selective Issues in Effective Medicaid Estate Recovery Statutes

33

be given whenever any person applies for Medicaid long-term care assistance.40
Second, the state may only seek recovery for long-term care monetary benefits
paid to a person at least fifty-five years of age. 41 Third, the state may not
institute any recovery program against Medicare savings plans.42 Fourth, the
state may not recover assets during the lifetime of the institutionalized recipient,
but only upon his or her death, the death of the non-institutionalized spouse, and
the death of any child with a disability or a child under the age of twenty-one.43
Fifth, the home of a recipient is exempt from estate recovery programs if a
sibling lives at the home and has done so for at least a year, or a child lives at
home and has done so for at least two years and has provided care to the
recipient, helping to keep the recipient at home.44 A sixth federal limit is the
requirement that each state implement a hardship program to exempt some
estates from recovery.45 As can be expected, state policies vary, but poverty and

40. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STATE MEDICAID MANUAL PART 3‒
ELIGIBILITY § 3810(G) (2001), http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/
Transmittals/downloads/r75sm3.pdf.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1)(B).
42. Id. § 1396p(b)(1)(B)(ii).
43. See id. § 1396p(b)(2)(A). The statute provides:
Any adjustment or recovery under paragraph (1) may be made only after the death of the
individual’s surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time—(A) when he has no surviving
child who is under the age 21, or (with respect to States eligible to participate in the State
program established under subchapter XVI of this chapter) is blind or permanently and
totally disabled, or (with respect to States which are not eligible to participate in such
program) is blind or disabled as defined in section 1382c of this title.
Id.
44. See id. § 1396p(b)(2)(B). The provision states:
[I]n the case of a lien on an individual’s home under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section,
when—(i) no sibling of the individual (who was residing in the individual’s home for a
period of at least one year immediately before the date of the individual’s admission to
the medical institution), and (ii) no son or daughter of the individual (who was residing
in the individual’s home for a period of at least two years immediately before the date of
the individual’s admission to the medical institution, and who establishes to the
satisfaction of the State that he or she provided care to such individual which permitted
such individual to reside at home rather than in an institution), is lawfully residing in
such home who has lawfully resided in such home on a continuous basis since the date
of the individual’s admission to the medical institution.
Id.
45. Id. § 1396p(b)(3)(A) (“The State shall establish procedures (in accordance with standards
specified by the Secretary) under which the agency shall waive the application of this subsection
(other than paragraph (1)(C)) if such application would work an undue hardship as determined on
the basis of criteria established by the Secretary.”).
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family dysfunction appear as common denominators of hardship.46 A few state
statutes delineate considerations to determine undue hardship.47
A seventh limitation on state estate recovery programs involves state
sponsored asset protection long-term care insurance policies.48 Sometimes these
46. See, e.g., West Virginia v. Thompson, 475 F.3d 204, 206, 208 (4th Cir. 2007) (affirming
the State Medicaid Manual hardship exemption for homes that are worth fifty percent or less of the
average price of homes in the county where the home is located and rejecting a state’s ruling that a
home worth more than this was worthy of the hardship exemption). See also Estate of Nicholson
v. S.C. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 660 S.E.2d 303, 306 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008) (stating that a
son’s imprisonment did not warrant a hardship waiver from the requirement that he actually live in
the home to prevent recovery).
47. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-76-436(b)(2) (West 2015). The statute provides:
In determining the existence of an undue hardship, the department shall consider factors
including, but not limited to, the following: (A) The asset subject to recovery is the sole
income-producing asset of the beneficiaries of the estate of the grantee of a beneficiary
deed under § 18-12-608; (B) Without receipt of the beneficiary deed or proceeds of the
estate, a grantee or beneficiary would become eligible for federal or state benefits; (C)
Allowing a grantee of a beneficiary deed under § 18-12-608 to receive the interest under
the beneficiary deed or a beneficiary to receive the inheritance from the estate would
enable the grantee or beneficiary to discontinue eligibility for federal or state benefits;
(D) The asset subject to recovery is a home with a value of fifty percent (50%) or less of
the average price of homes in the county where the homestead is located, as of the date
of the deceased recipient’s death; or (E) There are other compelling circumstances.
Id. But see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 400.112g(3)(e)(iii) (West 2015) (providing for “[a]
rebuttable presumption that no hardship exists if the hardship resulted from estate planning methods
under which assets were diverted in order to avoid estate recovery.”).
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1)(C)(iii). The statute provides:
[T]he term “qualified State long-term care insurance partnership” means an approved
State plan amendment under this subchapter that provides for the disregard of any assets
or resources in an amount equal to the insurance benefit payments that are made to or on
behalf of an individual who is a beneficiary under a long-term care insurance policy if
the following requirements are met: (I) The policy covers an insured who was a resident
of such State when coverage first became effective under the policy. (II) The policy is a
qualified long-term care insurance policy (as defined in section 7702B(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 [Title 26, U.S.C.A.]) issued not earlier than the effective date of
the State plan amendment. (III) The policy meets the model regulations and the
requirements of the model Act specified in paragraph (5). (IV) If the policy is sold to an
individual who—(aa) has not attained the age of 61 as of the date of purchase, the policy
provides compound annual inflation protection; (bb) has attained age 61 but has not
attained age 76 as of such date, the policy provides some level of inflation protection;
and (cc) has attained the age 76 as of such date, the policy may (but is not required to)
provide some level of inflation protection. (V) The State Medicaid agency under section
1396a(a)(5) of this title provides information and technical assistance to the State
insurance department on the insurance department’s role of assuring that any individual
who sells a long-term care insurance policy under this partnership receives training and
demonstrates evidence of an understanding of such policies and how they relate to other
public and private coverage of long-term care. (VI) The issuer of the policy provides
regular reports to the Secretary, in accordance with regulations of the Secretary, that
include notification regarding when benefits provided under the policy have been paid
and the amount of such benefits paid, notification regarding when the policy otherwise
terminates, and such other information as the Secretary determines may be appropriate
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policies are referred to as “partnership policies” and are means by which the
states may offset state-paid long-term costs with private insurance proceeds.49
Almost all of the states offer these policies, but only a few states offered them
in 1993 when the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act grandfathered the few
that did into an accepted practice.50 Furthermore, the DRA fostered the growth
of these policies, specifically Section 6021, and today states are permitted to
offer long-term care insurance policies that allow the applicant to retain assets
in proportion to the amount of insurance purchased.51 In addition to state plans,
an increasing number of persons are purchasing private long-term care
insurance.52 The Department of Health and Human Services has established
state reciprocity guidelines to ensure recognition among the states.53
The history of eligibility for Medicaid long-term care and the corresponding
estate recovery programs is intricately linked to the passage of successive federal
statutes.54 The recent enactment of these different statutes suggests that states
continue to develop corresponding regulations, prompting the judicial issues at
the focus of this Article. The following statutes form the basis for any discussion
of state law.

to the administration of such partnerships. (VII) The State does not impose any
requirement affecting the terms or benefits of such a policy unless the State imposes such
requirement on long-term care insurance policies without regard to whether the policy is
covered under the partnership or is offered in connection with such a partnership. In the
case of a long-term care insurance policy which is exchanged for another such policy,
subchapter (I) shall be applied based on the coverage of the first such policy that was
exchanged. For purposes of this clause and paragraph (5), the term “long-term care
insurance policy” includes a certificate issued under a group insurance contract.
Id.
49. See ERIC M. CARLSON, LONG TERM CARE ADVOCACY § 9.15, Lexis Nexis (database
updated 2014).
50. See TIMOTHY L. TAKACS, ELDER LAW PRACTICE IN TENNESSEE § 6.11[5], Lexis Nexis
(database updated 2015).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1)(C)(ii) (2012). The provision states:
[Estate recovery] shall not apply in the case of an individual who received medical
assistance under a State plan of a State which had a State plan amendment approved as
of May 14, 1993, and which satisfies clause (iv), or which has a State plan amendment
that provides for a qualified State long-term care insurance partnership (as defined in
clause (iii)) which provided for the disregard of any assets or resources—(I) to the extent
that payments are made under a long-term care insurance policy; or (II) because an
individual has received (or is entitled to receive) benefits under a long-term care
insurance policy.
Id.
52. Beth Slagle & Richard T. Victoria, Long-Term Care Lawsuits Will Just Keep Coming,
148 TRS. & ESTS. 60, 60 (2009).
53. See State Long-Term Care Partnership Program: State Reciprocity Standard, 73 Fed. Reg.
51,302, 51,303 (Sept. 2, 2008).
54. See Eligibility, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-programinformation/by-topics/eligibility/eligibility.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2015).
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A. Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988
The MCCA marked the initiation of a legislative process to protect against
spousal impoverishment.55 Congress passed the legislation with a number of
goals in mind.56 Specifically, Congress sought to exempt a flow of income to
the non-institutionalized spouse through: (1) a minimum monthly monetary
maintenance needs allowance (MMMNA);57 (2) an exemption of certain assets
through a community spouse resource allowance (CSRA); 58 and (3) an
exemption to separate the non-institutionalized spouse’s income from the
institutionalized spouse’s income.59 The purpose of the 1988 legislation was to
allow the non-institutionalized spouse to continue with his life without the fear
that everything earned or acquired during his marriage to the institutionalized
spouse would be spent on the cost of the institutionalized spouse’s long-term
care.60 The MCCA was a major achievement when it was enacted, even though
some of its features would be modified by future legislation.61 Among the more
important aspects of the MCCA are the following: (1) states were permitted but
not required to recover Medicaid benefits paid to recipients over sixty-five years
of age; (2) there was no definition of “estate,” although states were told that any
recovery had to be from the estate of the recipient; (3) recovery from the
55. See generally Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, 102
Stat. 683. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(4) (2012); New Mexico v. Div. of Med. Assistance &
Health Servs., 964 A.2d 822, 826 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (quoting Mistrick v. Div. of
Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 712 A.2d 188, 194 (N.J. 1998)). The MCCA was repealed by
the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Repeal Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-234, 103 Stat. 1979, but
the spousal impoverishment prevention provisions were retained. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(4).
56. See Stafford v. Idaho Dep’t. of Health & Welfare, 181 P.3d 456, 460, 463 (Idaho 2008)
(quoting Cleary ex rel. Cleary v. Waldman, 167 F.3d 801, 805 (3rd Cir. 1999)).
57. The minimum monthly maintenance needs allowance is based on a federal formula. See
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d)(3)‒(4). The goal is to permit the community spouse (the noninstitutionalized spouse) to receive adequate support, derived from that spouse’s income or, if
insufficient, the institutionalized spouse’s income. See id. § 1396r-5(d)(6).
58. Id. § 1396r-5(f)(1)‒(2). A community spouse is defined at 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(h)(2), and
the federal law specifies certain assets as exempt. See id. § 1396r-5(h)(2); id. § 1382b(a);
Hutcherson v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys. Admin., 667 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir.
2012) (identifying “[a] provision of the MCCA allow[ing] an institutionalized spouse to qualify for
Medicaid assistance while reserving for the community spouse a capped amount of assets for the
community spouse’s benefit, known as the ‘community spouse resource allowance’ or ‘CSRA’”).
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(b)(1). The MCCA provides that the assets of a noninstitutionalized spouse cannot be revisited once the institutionalized spouse qualifies for Medicaid
long-term care. See, e.g., Houghton v. Reinertson, 382 F.3d 1162, 1175 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding
that Colorado could not review the assets of the non-institutionalized spouse after eligibility is
determined for the institutionalized spouse). For a discussion of what constitutes separate property,
see In re Estate of Wiggins, 306 P.3d 201, 206 (Idaho 2013) (holding that the state may trace
community property that has been transmuted into separate property).
60. See, e.g, Stafford, 181 P.3d at 460 (citing Cleary, 167 F.3d at 805).
61. See Thomas R. Oliver, Philip R. Lee & Helene L. Lipton, A Political History of Medicare
and Prescription Drug Coverage, 82 MILBANK Q. 283, 298‒99, 301 (2004) (noting that the MCCA
was passed with “large, bipartisan majorities” although “most of [its] major provisions” were
repealed in 1989).
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recipient’s estate could only occur at the recipient’s surviving spouse’s death;
and (4) there was no express mention of recovery from the estate of a surviving
spouse.62
The MMMNA shifts income that would be attributable to the institutionalized
spouse—reducing eligibility for Medicaid long-term care—and makes this
income available to the non-institutionalized spouse, regardless of the source of
income. 63 The non-institutionalized spouse may keep all of his or her own
income, but if support is needed, the spouse may obtain only an amount up to
twenty-five percent of the excess of income over the MMMNA.64 The CSRA
allows the community spouse to retain a certain amount of resources without
affecting the eligibility of the institutionalized spouse.65 These exempt assets
are reflected in the couple’s resources, often assessed by the state Medicaid
agency at the time of the application for Medicaid long-term care.66 The state
may not seek recovery for Medicaid expenditures until after both spouses’
death.67 Thus, the 1988 legislation permitted the non-institutionalized spouse to
retain both income and assets (resources) rather than use them to pay for the
institutionalized spouse’s long-term care.68 The goal of the legislation was to
recognize the ownership rights of the non-institutionalized spouse in a
significant portion of the community assets, exempting income and resources
from attachment to pay for the institutionalized spouse’s care.69 Nonetheless,
since the MCCA’s enactment, litigation of the details continues, resulting in
additional legislation.70
B. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
To address some of the issues developing after the 1988 legislation, Congress
enacted the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA). 71
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1)(B)‒(C), (b)(2).
63. Id. § 1396r-5(d)(2), (6). See also supra note 57 and accompanying text.
64. Nursing Home Medicaid Coverage—Basic Financial Eligibility Rules About Income,
Resources, and Spousal Protections, N.Y. LEGAL ASSISTANCE GRP. (Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.
wnylc.com/health/pdf/96/.
65. Robyn O’Neill & Lee Beneze, A Guide to Medicaid’s Spousal Impoverishment Rules, 84
ILL. B.J. 22, 23 (1996).
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(1)(B).
67. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., POLICY BRIEF #3, supra note 19, at 10.
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(4).
69. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., Wis. Dep’t of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 492‒94 (2002)
(holding that income of the institutionalized spouse must first be given to the non-institutionalized
spouse to meet the minimum monthly maintenance needs allowance); Wojchowski v. Daines, 498
F.3d 99, 109‒10 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that Social Security payable to the institutionalized spouse
must first be applied to the non-institutionalized spouse); Burinskas v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 691
A.2d 586, 591‒92 (Conn. 1997) (holding that certain expenses incurred for home care may not be
covered by the monthly maintenance needs allowance).
71. See generally Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat.
312. See also Ira Stewart Wiesner, Obra ‘93 and Medicaid: Asset Transfers, Trust Availability,
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Specifically, the 1993 legislation provided for the following: (1) recovery could
be taken from a recipient at age fifty-five rather than sixty-five; (2) states were
now obligated to recover assets to the extent of expenditures made for a qualified
recipient; (3) a definition of “estate” was added, similar to what appears in the
current legislation; and (4) recovery may be initiated only after the surviving
recipient’s spouse’s death, but there was no definition of what constitutes the
estate of the surviving spouse.72
In summary, the 1993 legislation extended the “look-back” period during
which any transfer of assets may adversely affect eligibility for Medicaid longterm care benefits; the period was extended to thirty-six months.73 In addition,
the legislation removed any cap on the penalty period if a transfer is made during
the transfer period, and mandated added scrutiny requirements for any trust
established by applicants and their spouses.74 Additionally, if a transfer is made
by the institutionalized spouse or the non-institutionalized spouse, it is possible
to trace any of these assets through either party to succeeding holders of the
assets.75 Overall, the 1993 legislation sought to curb some of the advantages
provided in the MCCA,76 but the revisions of 1993 were nothing compared to
legislation enacted by Congress in 2005.77

and Estate Recovery Statutory Analysis in Context, 19 NOVA L. REV. 679, 682‒83 (1995) (noting
that there existed a perception in Congress that “well-to-do elders, through artifice and scheme,
were obtaining public payment of their nursing home care while preserving their financial security
and their ability to transmit wealth to younger generations,” and that this perception “was
crystallized by concerns raised primarily from the state Medicaid agencies and from the long-term
care insurance industry”).
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1)(B)‒(C), (2), (4).
73. Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(B)(i).
74. See William H. Overman & William A. McCormick, The SSI Anti-Fraud Provisions of
FCIA 99: Welfare Reform Continues, 13-WTR NAELA Q. 3, 3 (2000); Joel A. Mendler, Using
Trusts for Disabled Clients: Preserving Governmental Benefits, 44 LA. B.J. 26, 27 (1996). See,
e.g., Bucholtz v. Belshe, 114 F.3d 923, 926 (9th Cir. 1997). The case held that the California estate
recovery program was unable to reach the assets of an inter vivos trust pertaining to a decedent who
died prior to 1993; the trust was not part of what was termed the estate, because
a decedent’s property interests in revocable inter vivos trusts end at his death, and the
property vests in accordance with the trust terms alone, just as a decedent’s property
interests held in joint tenancy end at his death, and the property vests in accordance with
the terms of the joint tenancy provisions alone.
Id. But see Bonta v. Burke, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 72, 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (finding that the state
could recover from any assets in which the decedent Medicaid recipient held a remainder interest
in real property); In re Estate of Thompson, 586 N.W.2d 847, 851 (N.D. 1998) (holding that the
state could recover from the estate of the non-institutionalized spouse upon death of the
institutionalized spouse when assets were held at death through an inter vivos trust).
75. See, e.g., In re Estate of Bergman, 688 N.W.2d 187, 191‒92 (N.D. 2004) (permitting
tracing to access a Medicaid recipient’s property passed to his wife who transferred it to her son).
76. See supra note 71‒75 and accompanying text.
77. See infra Part I.C.
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C. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005
The DRA contained the most significant changes to Medicaid eligibility
rules.78 Like the 1993 legislation, the DRA provided even more restrictions to
transfers of homes, creations of annuities, and satisfaction of the MMMNA, and
extended the “look-back” period to sixty months from thirty-six.79 Specifically,
the changes initiated by the 2005 legislation were the following: (1) transfers by
spouses or applicants would be counted if made within five years (sixty months)
of applying for benefits; (2) penalties imposed by transfers were shifted from the
date of the actual transfer to the later date on which the Medicaid applicant
would have been eligible but for the transfer penalty; (3) any annuities purchased
must name the state as the remainder beneficiary, and the annuities must be
irrevocable and nonassignable;80 (4) purchases of life estates in another person’s
home loan repayments are scrutinized more closely; (5) exempt home equity
value assigned to a community spouse, a minor child, or a disabled child is
limited to a fixed amount indexed to inflation; and (6) establishing citizenship
and hence entitlement to benefits will be more closely scrutinized.81
Restrictions provided for the recovery of assets to pay for institutional care
for spouses, specific classes of children, and in some instances, siblings or adult
children. 82 Applicable restraints include the following: (1) the state cannot
recover from the recipient’s estate and cannot execute on a lien against the
recipient’s residence during the life of the surviving spouse;83 and (2) if the noninstitutionalized spouse dies prior to the institutionalized spouse’s death, the
state may not recover from spouse’s home if certain persons have lawfully lived
in that home on a continuous basis since the institutionalized spouse entered into
Medicaid long-term care.84 This includes children under the age of twenty-one,
blind or disabled children, children over the age of twenty-one who have resided
in the home for two years prior to the parent’s admission to an institution and
who had provided care to that parent allowing the parent to remain in the home
for as long as possible, and siblings who resided in the home at least one year
prior to the institutionalization of the Medicaid recipient.85

78. See generally Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4. For a
practitioner’s explanation of the legislation, see Bernard A. Krooks & Michael Gilfix, Navigating
the System, 150 TRS. & ESTS. 39, 42 (2011). See also Morris Klein, Medicaid Eligibility After the
2005 Deficit Reduction Act, 41 MD. B.J. 32, 34 (2008) (“The DRA imposes more significant
changes to the Medicaid program for long-term care than did previous laws.”).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(B)(i), (f)‒(g) (2012); id. § 1396r-5(d)(3)‒(6), (e)(2)(B)‒(C).
80. See Letter from Dennis G. Smith, supra note 36.
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(x)(1)‒(5); id. § 1396p(c)(1), (f)(1)‒(2).
82. Id. § 1396p(b)(1)‒(2).
83. Id. § 1396p(b)(2)(A)‒(B).
84. Id.
85. See id.
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In spite of the DRA’s progressive requirements, extensive litigation has arisen
concerning three specific issues.86 The first such issue is whether property in
which a Medicaid recipient had an interest, but passed this interest to another via
an “other arrangement,” may be subject to estate recovery.87 Traditionally, the
term “estate” encompassed property passing under a last will and testament or
through intestacy when there was no valid will. 88 But increasingly, wealth
transfer occurs through “other arrangements,” avoiding traditional estate
capture.89 Federal law provides for this evolution in definition as an option, but
state statutes have been slow to accommodate the more inclusive definition of
estate. 90 The second issue is whether the state may recover from assets
transferred prior to death by a Medicaid applicant or the applicant’s spouse.91
Because these assets do not pass at the time of death of either spouse,92 are they
“traceable” so as to be available to reimburse the state under estate recovery
programs? While the DRA contains language that seemingly decides this
issue,93 state courts are divided, and each side offers cogent reasons for each
dissimilar approach.94 The third issue is whether an annuity purchased to avoid
disqualifying excess assets may nonetheless be considered a resource or a
disqualifying transfer. 95 The business of supplying annuities for spouses of
recipients of long-term care has become significant. 96 The DRA seemingly
86. See infra notes 87, 91, 95 and accompanying text.
87. See 42 U.S.C. §1396p(b)(4)(A)‒(B). See also, e.g., Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v.
McCormick, 283 P.3d 785, 791 (Idaho 2012).
88. See RAYMOND C. O’BRIEN & MICHAEL FLANNERY, DECEDENT’S ESTATES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 5 (2d ed. 2011).
89. See, e.g., McCormick, 283 P.3d at 791.
90. See infra Part II.B; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., POLICY BRIEF #1, supra
note 21, at 5.
91. See, e.g., McCormick, 283 P.3d at 794 (citing In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882, 885
(N.D. 2000)); In re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 71 (Minn. 2008).
92. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B); infra note 232 and accompanying text.
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(A)‒(B) (“[T]he term ‘estate’ . . . may include, at the option
of the State . . . , any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had
any legal title or interest at the time of death . . . including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir,
or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life
estate, living trust, or other arrangement.”).
94. Compare McCormick, 283 P.3d at 794 (quoting Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 885) (arguing in
favor of subjecting assets conveyed by the recipient to the recipient’s spouse before the recipient’s
death and “traceable to the recipient’s estate . . . to the department’s recovery claim” while not
necessarily including “all property ever held by either party during the marriage”); with Barg, 752
N.W.2d at 71 (finding “no principled basis on which to interpret the federal law to allow recovery
of assets in which the Medicaid recipient did not have an interest at the time of her death” and that
“the language of the federal law clearly limits [the expanded definition of ‘estate’] to assets in
which the recipient had an interest at the time of her death”).
95. See, e.g., Lopes v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 696 F.3d 180, 184 (2d Cir. 2012).
96. See generally Craig J. Langstraat, Lanitra Harris & James M. Plecnik, Annuity Strategy
When Spouse Needs Nursing Home Coverage, 41 EST. PLANNING 25, 25 (2014) (discussing the use
of annuities by spouses of long-term care recipients).
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provides sufficient guidelines, but legal issues continue to arise.97 This Article
thus takes each issue in turn.
II. FIRST ISSUE: DEFINING ESTATE
A. Exempt Marital Property
Exemption of marital or community property permitted by successive federal
laws created the need for estate recovery.98 By exempting the applicant spouse’s
defined resources, assets, and income to prevent the impoverishment of the noninstitutionalized spouse, these monetary resources became temporarily
unavailable for Medicaid expenditures.99 Estate recovery, eventually mandated
by federal statute, is the attempt to recapture some or all of these assets not
expended on Medicaid payments, and collection was to occur upon the death of
both spouses.100 This process is illustrated by the OBRA.101 When Congress
enacted legislation mandating that every state cooperate with federal law to
provide Medicaid long-term care benefits, it correspondingly mandated a
program to recover expenditures paid on behalf of any institutionalized
Medicaid recipient.102 This program is known as “estate recovery,”103 and every
state currently has a nominal statutory program to recover Medicaid
expenditures made on behalf of an institutionalized person.104
The goal of the estate recovery program is two-fold. First, federal and state
law recognizes that all assets acquired during marriage are community or marital
assets earned from the joint efforts of both parties.105 Thus, if one of the parties
requires long-term care, he or she may qualify for Medicaid as “poor” by
exempting some of the marital assets as a recognition that the noninstitutionalized spouse earned those assets and should be entitled to their use.106
97. See supra notes 86‒96 and accompanying text. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(A)‒(B)
(defining the “estate” and its contents); id. § 1396r-5(c)(2) (providing for attribution of resources
to spouses).
98. See supra Part I.A‒C.
99. See, e.g., Barg, 752 N.W.2d at 59 (“Medicaid thus balances the obligation of community
spouses to contribute to the payment of medical expenses for their recipient spouses against the
accommodation of the community spouse’s need to provide for his or her own support.”).
100. See Estate Recovery and Liens, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/medicaidchip-program-information/by-topics/eligibility/estate-recovery.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2015).
See also supra note 67 and accompanying text.
101. See supra Part I.B.
102. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1)(A) (2012) (“In the case of an individual described in subsection
(a)(1)(B) of this section, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual’s estate or
upon sale of the property subject to a lien imposed on account of medical assistance paid on behalf
of the individual.”). See id. § 1396p(b)(1)(B) (providing recovery provisions for persons fifty-five
years of age or older at the time that such person obtained medical assistance).
104. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
105. See infra Part IV.B; 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(b)(1).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(4).
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But second, spouses have a duty to provide necessities for each other, and health
care is a necessity.107 Therefore, upon both spouses’ death, there should be an
“estate recovery” from exempted assets and income to pay for long-term care.108
In essence, the state is seeking to recover Medicaid expenditures made on behalf
of the institutionalized spouse from assets that were exempt because they
provided a home (assets) or income to a non-institutionalized spouse.109 This
process became codified as a result of federal legislation beginning in 1993, with
certain rules becoming mandatory: (1) the age for recovery was lowered to fiftyfive; (2) the state could seek recovery from the recipient’s estate; (3) recovery
of any expenditures are permitted only after the recipient’s surviving spouse’s
death; and (4) the state has an option to enact a more inclusive definition of what
constitutes an estate asset, such as when the decedent owned an interest that
passes through nonprobate transfer, such as joint tenancy.110
Exempt marital assets were never intended to be exempt in perpetuity.111 The
ultimate intent of the estate recovery program is to subject the community assets
generated by the two spouses to payment of any Medicaid expenditures;
recovery is delayed until the surviving spouse’s death to permit the non-recipient
spouse to use the exempt assets in an unfettered fashion.112 Sadly, upon the
107. See Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618 N.E.2d 1, 8 (Ind. 1993) (“When . . . there is
a shortfall between a dependent spouse’s necessary expenses and separate funds, the law will
impose limited secondary liability upon the financially superior spouse by means of the doctrine of
necessaries.”). See also id. at 3‒4 (noting that the doctrine of necessaries in its various iterations
has generally been extended to medical care).
108. See, e.g., In re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 65 (Minn. 2008) (“The State may not seek
recovery from the beneficiary’s estate until the death of the surviving spouse, if any, and only if the
individual has no surviving minor or disabled child.”) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 103-11, at 208
(1993)). See also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., POLICY BRIEF #4, MEDICAID LIENS
3 (2005), http://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/74096/liens.pdf (“The objective [of estate
recovery] was to recover taxpayer dollars invested in Medicaid by requiring more people to use
private resources to defray the cost of their own long-term care.”).
109. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., POLICY BRIEF #4, supra note 108, at 3.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1), (4). See, e.g., Barg, 752 N.W.2d at 61. The court stated:
For example, when two persons hold property in joint tenancy with a right of survivorship
and one dies, the deceased joint tenant’s interest ordinarily passes directly to the
surviving joint tenant and is not part of the probate estate. Under the optional expanded
definition allowed by federal law, for Medicaid recovery purposes the interest of a
deceased joint tenant who had received Medicaid would be included in his estate, rather
than passing directly to the surviving joint tenant.
Id.
111. See In re Estate of Thompson, 586 N.W.2d 847, 850‒51 (N.D. 1998) (discussing the
legislative purpose allowing for state recovery of Medicaid benefits from recipient’s estate
following the surviving spouse’s death and the fact that “the relevant statutory provisions, in light
of the Congressional purpose to provide medical care for the needy, reveals a legislative intention
to allow states to trace the assets of recipients of medical assistance and recover the benefits paid
when the recipient’s surviving spouse dies”).
112. See id. See also Janel C. Frank, Note, How Far Is Too Far? Tracing Assets in Medicaid
Estate Recovery, 79 N.D. L. REV. 111, 122, 129, 140 (2003) (noting the “dual interests” served by
allowing the surviving spouses to retain assets while alive and permitting Medicaid to recover upon
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death of both spouses, family members are distraught when they discover that
what they thought was permanently exempt is now subject to recovery. The
media has taken notice of estate recovery, with one local newspaper painting a
vivid picture of the process: “[the family] pictured the state as the villain in the
black cape, like the villain in melodrama depicted on the silent movie screen,
appearing on the doorstep to foreclose and leave the family on the street.”113
Reflecting the fact that exempt assets were meant to safeguard the financial
investment of spouses and the dependency of certain other persons, exempt
assets may include the following: (1) the applicant’s home up to a certain value
and subject to continuing residency of a spouse or a minor or disabled or
caregiving child; (2) an automobile, regardless of value if it is used for
transportation; (3) all of the community property within the home, regardless of
value if there is a community spouse, but otherwise with value qualifications;
(4) property used for trade or business and necessary for support; (5) tools of the
applicant’s or spouse’s trade; (6) any life insurance policy up to a face value of
$1,500; (7) burial plots for the applicant and for family members plus prepaid
costs for burial; and (8) $1,500 for revocable funeral arrangements.114 These
exempt assets and the corresponding federal statutes would seem to clarify any
questions pertaining to estate recovery, but issues remain.115

their deaths); In re Estate of Craig, 624 N.E.2d 1003, 1006 (N.Y. 1993) (highlighting the 1993
amendment to estate recovery provisions of federal law which allows states to recover against a
recipient’s estate, but only those assets “conveyed through joint tenancy and other specified
forms of survivorship”).
113. Sandra Reed, You Can’t Take It With You, But Can the State Take It From You?, GLEN
ROSE RPTR. (Nov. 10, 2014, 11:31 AM), http://www.yourglenrosetx.com/opinion/columinsts/
article_f6fb9858-a3e3-55b4-9cf7-3db4289cd76f.html. Across the country there are similar
comments. See, e.g., Beth Duffy, Estates Could Owe Medicaid, THE GAZETTE (Grand Cedar
Rapids, Iowa) (Mar. 28, 2014, 8:23 PM), http://www.thegazette.com/2013/09/13/estates-couldowe-medicaid (predicting that Medicaid expansion might cause a cycle of poverty); Carole Fader,
Fact Check: What Happens When a Medicaid Recipient Dies?, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Jacksonville)
(Mar. 29, 2014), http://jacksonville.com/reason/fact-check/2014-03-27/story/fact-check-whathappens-when-medicaid-recipient-dies (noting that estates of the deceased may be responsible for
paying back all Medicaid costs); Monica J. Franklin, Elder Law Update: Medicaid Estate Recovery
in Tennessee, 48 TENN. B.J. 35, 36‒37 (2012) (explaining how estate recovery expansion may have
negative consequences for the elderly); Katrina S. Jones & Marco D. Chayet, Resolving a Medicaid
Claim in a Decedent’s Probate Estate, 37 COLO. LAW. 31, 32‒33, 36 (2008) (noting that states use
liens to collect against all property not only probate estates); Shannon Mullen, Medicaid’s Death
Bill Leaves Homes, Assets at Risk, ASBURY PARK PRESS (N.J.) (Feb. 16, 2014, 5:33 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/02/16/medicaid-death-bill-homes-assets-at-risk
/5534575/; Craig Reaves, Paying for the “Institutionalized Spouse,” N.Y. TIMES: NEW OLD AGE
BLOG (June 4, 2010, 9:00 AM), http://newoldage.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/04/paying-for-theinstiutionalized-spouse (showing that through estate recovery, Medicaid will recoup expenses
before heirs are able to receive inheritance).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(a), (d).
115. See supra notes 93, 114 and accompanying text.
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B. Constituting the Estate
Determining the parameters of the estate and then the process of estate
recovery begins with the long-term care recipient’s death. The state may require
the personal representative of the recipient’s estate to notify the state so the state
can assess whether estate recovery is appropriate. 116 What constitutes a
recipient’s estate must include first, “all real and personal property and other
assets included within the individual’s estate, as defined for purposes of State
probate law.”117 These assets constitute the minimum and they may be limited
depending on the state’s probate statute.118 But there is a second segment to the
federal legislation: federal law permits states to exercise an option to expand the
definition of estate to include other assets owned at death but passing outside of
traditional probate. 119 These would include joint tenancy, survivorship
provisions, life estates, living trusts, and other arrangements.120 Modern forms
of wealth transfer pass a great deal of wealth through these mechanisms, and
they are incorporated into this optional portion of the federal statute.121
Specifically, the optional portion of the federal legislation expands assets
beyond the range of traditional forms of probate,122 providing:

116. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 215 (West 2015). The statute states:
Where a deceased person has received or may have received health care under Chapter 7
(commencing with Section 14000) or Chapter 8 (commencing with Section 14200) of
Part 3 of Division 9 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, or was the surviving spouse of
a person who received that health care, the estate attorney, or if there is no estate attorney,
the beneficiary, the personal representative, or the person in possession of property of the
decedent shall give the Director of Health Care Services notice of the decedent’s death
not later than 90 days after the date of death. The notice shall include a copy of the
decedent’s death certificate. The notice shall be given as provided in Section 1215,
addressed to the director at the Sacramento office of the director.
Id. See also MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-13-317 (West 2015); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 50-24.1-07(3)
(West 2015).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(A).
118. See id.; see, e.g., In re Estate of Jones, 280 S.W.2d 647, 651 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (noting
that the federal statute represents the minimum assets included in the estate); Hines v. Dep’t of Pub.
Aid, 831 N.E.2d 641, 645 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (noting that the state probate statute did consider a
decedent’s automobile to be part of the estate).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B).
120. Id.
121. See John H. Langbein, Major Reforms of the Property Restatement and the Uniform
Probate Code: Reformation, Harmless Error, and Nonprobate Transfers, 38 ACTEC L.J. 1, 10
(2012) (“The deepest trend now affecting the day-to-day reality of gratuitous transfers in the United
States is the nonprobate revolution, by which I mean the burgeoning use of will substitutes to
transfer property on death.”).
122. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 41 (9th
ed. 2013) (“Probate property is property that passes through probate under the decedent’s will . . .
or by intestacy . . . . Nonprobate property is property that passes outside of probate by way of a
will substitute . . . .”). Examples of nonprobate transfers are inter vivos trusts, life insurance, joint
tenancies, and payable on death contracts. Id. at 42.
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[A recipient’s estate] may include, at the option of the State (and shall
include, in the case of an individual to whom paragraph (1)(C)(i)
applies), any other real and personal property and other assets in which
the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the
extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor,
heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other
arrangement.123
Assets are further defined as including income and resources of the individual
and the individual’s spouse, including any “income or resources [to] which the
individual or such individual’s spouse is entitled.”124 Because states may define
the probate estate in a manner that does not exceed federal guidelines, state
statutes vary on what is included.125 Some state statutes are expansive in scope,
some are restrictive, and some specifically exclude assets from the probate
estate. 126 Federal preemption is rare, and states may exercise initiative;
123. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B). An individual taking under paragraph (1)(C)(i) is someone
“who has received (or is entitled to receive) benefits under a long-term care insurance policy in
connection with which assets or resources are disregarded.” Id. § 1396p(b)(1)(C)(i).
124. Id. § 1396p(h)(1).
125. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.07.055 (West 2015); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2935
(2015); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-76-436 (West 2015); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14009.5 (West
2015); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25.5-4-302 (West 2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17b-93
(West 2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, §§ 5001, 5003 (West 2015); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit 29, §§
6700‒6702 (LexisNexis 2015); FLA. STAT. § 409.9101 (West 2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-147.1
(West 2015); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 346-37 (West 2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 56-218 (West
2015); 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/5-13 (West 2015); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-15-9-0.5 (West
2015); IOWA CODE ANN. § 249A.53 (West 2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-709 (West 2015); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.624 (West 2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:153 (2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 14 (West 2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 118E, § 31 (West 2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 400.112g, 400.112h, 400.112i, 400.112k (West 2015); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256B.15
(West 2015); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 43-13-317 (West 2015); MO. ANN. STAT. § 473.398 (West
2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-6-167 (West 2015); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 68-919 (West 2015);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 422.29302 (West 2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 167:13, 167:14 (West
2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-7.2 (West 2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-2A-4 (West 2015); N.Y.
SOC. SERV. LAW § 369 (McKinney 2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 108A-70.5 (West 2015); N.D.
CENT. CODE ANN. § 50-24.1-07 (West 2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5162.21, 5162.211–.212
(West 2015); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 5051.3 (West 2015); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.795
(West 2015); 62 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1412 (West 2015); 40 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 40-8-15 (West 2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-7-460 (2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 28-6-23 to
23.1 (West 2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-5-116 (West 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-19-13.5
(West 2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 122, 2113 (West 2015); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-326.1,
32.1-327 (West 2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.20B.080 (West 2015); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
9-5-11c (West 2015); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 49.496, 49.682 (West 2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 42-4206 (West 2015).
126. See, e.g., Estate of Darby v. Stinson, 68 So. 3d 702, 706, 708 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011)
(holding that the state’s homestead exemption statute excluded a portion of the decedent’s estate
from probate and the estate recovery program). The court noted that “some states have incorporated
a broad definition of estate for Medicaid expense recovery programs.” Id. at 705. See MISS CODE
ANN. § 85-3-21 (West 2015) (specifically exempting certain land and buildings up to a certain size
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however, states must comply with federal law when defining assets, what
constitutes probate, and when and to what extent payment is to be made to
individuals.127 Without a federal mandate, it is difficult to conceive of national
uniformity for estate recovery programs.128
Some states permit singular examples of nonprobate transfers, such as
recovery from real property held by a married couple under tenancy by the
entirety.129 But strict construction permits this transfer to be included only when
the state probate statute specifically incorporates this transfer in the probate
estate.130 Other states incorporate language of the federal Medicaid statute,131
but many states ignore the opportunity to define the estate in a truly inclusive
fashion.132 An inclusive statute would contain an expanded definition of the
probate estate to include all forms of nonprobate transfers, including those listed
in federal legislation, such as joint tenancies, living trusts, and payable on death

and value under a homestead exemption). But other state statutes have used the expanded federal
option and included transfers not within traditional probate. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §
249A.53(2)(b) (West 2015) (including the entirety of both a beneficiary’s and his or her spouse’s
estates); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 14.2-1(F)(2) (West 2015) (permitting living trusts); MO.
ANN. STAT. § 473.398(6) (West 2015) (allowing life insurance proceeds).
127. 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(18); In re Jones, 280 S.W.3d 647, 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). For a
discussion of federal preemption of state law, see Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. McCormick,
283 P.3d 785, 794‒95 (Idaho 2012) (holding that federal law did not preempt the state’s ability to
recover from the estate what was once a Medicaid recipient’s community property).
128. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (demonstrating the variety of state recovery
statutes).
129. See In re Estate of Bruce, 260 S.W.3d 398, 400, 402‒03 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) “empowers Missouri to define ‘estate’ broadly and thereby to pursue
property that a recipient owned jointly with another individual when the recipient died but that
would not be included in the decedent’s estate,” where the decedent had owned a home with his
wife as a tenancy by the entirety).
130. See, e.g., id. at 402‒03.
131. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 56-218(4) (West 2015). The statute provides:
For purposes of this section, the term “estate” shall include: (a) All real and personal
property and other assets included within the individual’s estate, as defined for purposes
of state probate law; and (b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in
which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death, to the extent of
such interest, including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased
individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living
trust or other arrangement.
Id. See also 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-13 § 5-13 (West 2015) (including claims against estate
of recipients); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-15-9-0.5(a)(1)‒(4) (West 2015); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 14.2(2-1)(F)(1)‒(2) (2015).
132. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., POLICY BRIEF #1, supra note 21, at 5
(“[E]vidence is lacking on what types of assets are included under the broad definition of estate in
those states that have elected to extend their recovery efforts beyond the probate estate. One study
determined that 20 of 40 responding states using the Federal minimum definition, while the
remaining 24 states used some variation of the broader option. A later study reported that 30 of 48
responding states used the minimum definition.”).
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certificates and contracts. 133 It would also permit tracing the assets at the
surviving spouse’s death.134 But federal law does not require this expanded
definition; federal law requires only that the state’s definition of estate include
“all real and personal property and other assets included within the individual’s
estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law.”135 If the state does not use
the precise language of the federal statute in its probate law, then there is a risk
that some nonprobate transfers will not be available to the state recovery
program.136 Thus, because of state variations in defining what constitutes the
estate, there is an elusive aspect to estate recovery.
Disparity among the states in collecting under estate recovery programs likely
results from the large federal subsidy provided for Medicaid, the complexity of
the subject area, and the nascent possibility of any recovery at all.137 Often state
statutes have not embraced modern forms of wealth transfer at death, and the
parameters of what constitutes the estates are vague.138 In spite of the fact that
federal law permits a broader description of what is included in probate, the
states have been slow to adopt more expansive language.139 The cost of failure
to recover estate assets can be high for both federal and state agencies, and

133. See In re Estate of Thompson, 586 N.W.2d 847, 850 (N.D. 1998) (giving an example of
an expansive definition of the estate).
134. See infra Part III (discussing the tracing of transferred assets).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(A) (2012). Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)
instructs the state to specify what is included in the definition of estate. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., THE STATE MEDICAID MANUAL §
3810 (2001), http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/Paper-BasedManuals-Items/CMS021927.html?DLPage=1&DLSort=0&DLSortDir=ascending.
136. See supra notes 130‒32 and accompanying text.
137. For a discussion of the disparity among states and the type of issues that cause the
differences, see U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., POLICY BRIEF #1, supra note 21, at 1‒
2, 8 (noting that only twelve states had recovery programs before 1990, that Medicaid is the “largest
source of funds for institutional long-term care expenses,” and that there are “complex tax
implications” involved).
138. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 118E, § 31(c) (West 2015) (“For purposes of this
section, ‘estate’ shall mean all real and personal property and other assets includable in the
decedent’s probate estate under the General Laws.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 400.112h(a) (West
2015). The Michigan provision states:
“Estate” means all property and other assets included within an individual’s estate that is
subject to probate administration under article III of the estates and protected individuals
code, [MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.] 700.3101 to 700.3988, except assets otherwise subject
to claims under section 3805(3) of the estates and protected individuals code, [MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN.] 700.3805, are not part of the estate.
Id. For a discussion of state hesitancy to accommodate nonprobate transfers in modern statutes,
see Raymond C. O’Brien, Integrating Marital Property Into a Spouse’s Elective Share, 59 CATH.
U. L. REV. 617, 638 (2010).
139. See supra note 132 and accompanying text; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
POLICY BRIEF #1, supra note 21, at 5.
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failure to collect frustrates congressional intent as recited in the OBRA and most
recently the DRA.140
An illustration of a state statutory deficiency occurred in In re Estate of
Jones.141 The facts included a Medicaid recipient who died at the age of ninetytwo owing the state $22,226.24 in Medicaid long-term care benefits that were
paid on his behalf.142 At his death, his only asset—his home—passed to his
children via a beneficiary deed, a nonprobate transfer device not traditionally
associated with transfer through probate.143 The home was valued at $24,000
and would have been sufficient to reimburse the state for its Medicaid
expenditures, but the decedent’s children argued that “because the State has not
amended the definition of ‘estate’ [in its code] to include nonprobate transfers,
the State cannot recover its Medicaid benefits from a nonprobate transfer.”144
At the time, the Missouri probate code defined the term estate as including “the
real and personal property of the decedent or ward, as from time to time changed
in form by sale, reinvestment or otherwise, and augmented by any accretions
and additions thereto and substitutions therefor, and diminished by any deceases
and distributions therefrom.”145 The beneficiary deed used by the decedent to
transfer the home to his children was an effective nonprobate transfer device,146
prompting the question as to whether this form of transfer could be included in
the state’s definition of estate.147
The Missouri Court of Appeals framed the issue as not involving whether the
transfer could be included in the state definition of estate, but rather whether the
state’s estate recovery statutes allowed the state to proceed as a creditor.148 This
issue depends on the construction of another state statute specifying that: “Each
recipient of a recoverable transfer of a decedent’s property shall be liable to
account for a pro rata share of the value of all such property received, to the
140. Cases often refer to the purpose of Congress to recover Medicaid expenditures. See, e.g.,
Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785, 788 (Idaho 2012) (stating that
“Medicaid has always been intended to be the ‘payer of last resort’”); In re Estate of Barg, 752
N.W.2d 52, 58‒60 (Minn. 2008) (discussing the congressional intent behind Medicaid and the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act); In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882, 885‒86 (N.D. 2000)
(finding that Congress “revealed an intent to allow states a wide latitude in seeking Medicaid benefit
recoveries”).
141. 280 S.W.3d 647 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
142. Id. at 649‒50
143. Id. at 649, 651; Susan N. Gary, Transfer-on-Death Deeds: The Nonprobate Revolution
Continues, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 529, 532 (2006) (noting that “[a] transfer-on-death deed
or TOD deed, also known as a beneficiary deed, allows the owner of real property to execute a deed
that names the beneficiary who will succeed to ownership at the owner’s death” and that “if the
owner records the deed and does not revoke it, the beneficiary will be able to obtain title to the
property at the owner’s death without going through probate”) (footnote omitted).
144. Jones, 280 S.W.3d at 650.
145. Id. at 651; MO. ANN. STAT. § 472.010(11) (West 2015).
146. Jones, 280 S.W.3d at 651.
147. Id. at 651‒52.
148. Id.
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extent necessary to discharge . . . claims remaining unpaid after application of
the decedent’s estate . . . .”149 Recoverable transfer is defined as “a nonprobate
transfer of a decedent’s property under sections 461.003 to 461.081.” 150
Therefore, the court held that the state was a creditor and may bring an action
for recovery of the money owed, even though the home was transferred through
a beneficiary deed, a nonprobate transfer.151
Although the state was allowed to recover for long-term care benefits,152 the
case illustrates the failure of the state’s statute and the difficulty of recovery.153
This problem resulted from the fact that the estate recovery statute did not
include the array of nonprobate transfers commonly used to transfer property at
death—all of which are listed as permissible for the state to use.154 Instead,
recovery occurred because the state was a creditor and, as such, could seek
restitution for monetary contribution from nonprobate assets if the probate estate
was insufficient.155 The case illustrates the issue of whether the state’s estate
recovery statute is broad enough to encompass the transfer of an asset at the
death of the recipient or of his or her spouse.156 Some state courts have accepted
the challenge by interpreting state statutes broadly.157 Other states have not been
willing to adopt an expansive definition. 158 These different approaches are
illustrated in the following material.
1. Expansive Statutory Construction
An expansive approach towards estate recovery is illustrated in the Supreme
Court of North Dakota’s decision in In re Estate of Thompson.159 The facts are
typical of an estate recovery case; a married couple obtained long-term care
Medicaid benefits for one spouse, and the other received exempt assets or

149. Id. at 652 (citing MO. ANN. STAT. § 461.300.1 (West 2015)).
150. Id. (citing MO. ANN. STAT. § 461.300.10(4)).
151. Id. at 655.
152. See id. at 655‒56.
153. See id. at 651 (commenting that “the State admits that Missouri has not expanded the
definition of ‘estate’ to include nonprobate transfers”).
154. Id. at 650‒51; 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (2012).
155. Id. at 654‒56. For additional statutory liability whenever the probate estate is insufficient,
see UNIF. PROB. CODE § 6-102 (amended 2010).
156. Jones, 280 S.W.3d at 650. See also Hines v. Dep’t of Pub. Aid, 831 N.E.2d 641, 646 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2005), aff’d, 850 N.E.2d 148 (Ill. 2006) (holding that an expansive reading of the statute
is not warranted and is preempted by federal law).
157. See, e.g., Estate of Marusich v. State, 313 P.3d 1272, 1278, 1280‒81 (Wyo. 2013)
(commenting on other courts’ approaches and applying an expanded definition of “estate”).
158. See, e.g., Hines, 831 N.E.2d at 645 (finding that “[the decedent’s] interest in [a] home and
[an] automobile would not be included in his ‘estate’ [under state law]”); In re Estate of Darby, 68
So. 3d 702, 705‒06 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that states have the ability to adopt a broader
definition of estate).
159. 586 N.W.2d 847, 850 (N.D. 1998) (noting that the “‘plain meaning’ of the very broad
definition of the recipient’s estate in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) must also be considered”).
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income.160 The husband’s benefits totaled $58,237.30, provided between 1991
and his death in 1992.161 He predeceased his wife, who died in 1995 with an
estate of $46,507.98.162 Then, in accordance with state law, after the personal
representative notified the state of the wife’s death, the state initiated a claim to
recover the money spent on her husband’s care ($58,237.30) plus interest
($9,356.79).163 Between the time of the death of the Medicaid recipient (the
husband), but prior to the death of the recipient’s spouse (the wife), North
Dakota adopted an estate recovery statute that was based on the federal expanded
definition of what constitutes the probate estate.164 The federal statute provided
the following:
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term “estate”, with respect to
a deceased individual—(A) shall include all real and personal property
and other assets included within the individual’s estate, as defined for
purposes of State probate law; and (B) may include, at the option of
the State . . . any other real and personal property and other assets in
which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death
(to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a
survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or
other arrangement.165
The state filed a claim against the estate of the surviving spouse upon that
spouse’s death under the state’s estate recovery statute, 166 and the personal
representative of the now-deceased surviving spouse refused payment.167 The
personal representative argued that federal law prohibits the state from collecting
for Medicaid benefits paid to a predeceasing recipient spouse from the estate of
a surviving spouse.168 In other words, although it is possible to collect from the
recipient spouse, the state is prohibited from collecting from the surviving

160. Id. at 848‒49.
161. Id. at 848.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 849‒50.
165. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (2012).
166. Thompson, 586 N.W.2d at 848. At the time, N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-24.1-07(1)‒(2)
provided:
(1) On the death of any recipient of medical assistance who was fifty-five years of age or
older when the recipient received the assistance, and on the death of the spouse of such
a deceased recipient, the total amount of medical assistance paid on behalf of the recipient
following the recipient’s fifty-fifth birthday must be allowed as a preferred claim against
the decedent’s estate . . . (2) No claim must be paid during the lifetime of the decedent’s
surviving spouse, if any . . . .
Id. at 849 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 50-24.1-07(1)‒(2) (West 2015)).
167. Id. at 848, 850.
168. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1) (prohibiting recovery of medical assistance paid for an
individual under the state Medicaid plan except under certain circumstances).
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spouse. In response to the personal representative, the state relied upon another
section of the federal statute permitting the state to collect from the surviving
spouse the value of medical assistance paid to the recipient after the nonrecipient surviving spouse’s death. 169 However, the personal representative
contended that even if the state were correct, the state’s recovery statute was not
enacted until after the recipient spouse’s death in 1992. 170 The personal
representative argued that the state statute could not be applied retroactively to
collect from the non-recipient surviving spouse at her death in 1995.171
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that a state estate recovery program
could not collect from the estate of a decedent recipient of Medicaid long-term
care during the lifetime of that recipient’s spouse. 172 Nonetheless, the state
could, upon that recipient’s spouse’s death, inquire how that surviving nonrecipient spouse acquired any assets from the recipient and then utilize the estate
recovery statute to collect any amounts paid for long-term care.173 Furthermore,
the state statute’s expanded definition of what constitutes the probate estate
offers added elements that may be included in the recovery program at the
surviving spouse’s death. 174 The fact that the expanded definition of what
constitutes the probate estate was not adopted until after the recipient spouse’s
death was immaterial. 175 The statute was in effect at the surviving spouse’s
death.176 The practice contemplated by the state was valid since the state was
simply collecting a debt that was due, not applying a statute retroactively.177
By permitting the state statute to be applied against the estate of a Medicaid
recipient who died prior to the enactment of the statute, the state court adopted
169. Thompson, 586 N.W.2d at 850. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4). See also Idaho Dep’t of
Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785, 790‒91 (Idaho 2012) (holding that assets may
include any property in which the Medicaid recipient spouse owns or holds an interest after October
1, 1993); In re Estate of Craig, 624 N.E.2d 1003, 1006 (N.Y. 1993) (construing the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993 to permit estate recovery programs against surviving non-recipient
spouses).
170. Thompson, 586 N.W.2d at 851‒52.
171. Id. The personal representative argued that the state was seeking an “inappropriate
retroactive application of a statute.” Id. at 852.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 850‒51.
174. Id. at 850 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) as outlining the types of property
recoverable under the state statute). The court stated:
That expansive definition is broad enough to encompass the department’s claim against
the estate of a deceased spouse of a deceased recipient of medical assistance benefits for
the amount of medical assistance paid out, to the extent the recipient at the time of death
had any title or interest in assets which were conveyed to his or her spouse . . . .
Id.
175. Id. at 852 (concluding that the state’s claim would not be an impermissible “retroactive”
application of law because the duty to repay “arises upon receipt of the benefits”) (quoting In re
Estate of Hooey, 521 N.W.2d 85, 87 (N.D. 1994)).
176. Id. at 849.
177. Id. at 852.
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an expansive approach to estate recovery.178 The court implied that such a ruling
is justified in light of the state’s policy of promoting “wide latitude in seeking
estate recoveries.” 179 The practice is also consistent with the policy of state
collection upon both spouses’ death, one or both of whom collected long-term
care benefits.180 Such a conclusion, a preference for an expansive state recovery
approach, is shared by other courts. 181 For example, the Supreme Court of
Idaho, deciding whether the state’s estate recovery program was preempted by
federal law, held that, “[i]n light of the ambiguously inclusive nature of 42
U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) and the plain definition of ‘assets’ in 42 U.S.C. §
1396(h)(1), we cannot find that federal law preempts the State from providing
for recovery of assets.”182 It appears that courts find an expansive approach to
estate recovery based on the federal mandate that states engage in recovery, a
preference for avoiding federal preemption, and overarching policy goals.183
2. Strict Statutory Construction
Not every state agrees with the expansive approach taken by the North Dakota
Supreme Court. A notable example is the Illinois decision of Hines v.
Department of Public Aid.184 The Appellate Court of Illinois held that federal
Medicaid law did not permit estate recovery from the estate of the surviving
spouse of a Medicaid recipient of long-term care. 185 The facts involved a
husband who applied for and began receiving Medicaid long-term care
assistance in 1994.186 At the time he began receiving benefits, he and his wife
jointly owned a home and an automobile, and he received long-term care
benefits until his death in 1997.187 The recipient’s spouse survived her husband

178. Id. (holding that the decedent’s obligation to repay his benefits began at the time of the
receipt, and that the statute is not retroactive when it draws upon facts antecedent to its passing);
see also id. at 850 (determining that an expansive reading of the statute allowed the state to make
a claim against the estate of a deceased person who was married to a benefit recipient).
179. Id. at 851.
180. See id.
181. See, e.g., Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785, 794‒95 (Idaho
2012).
182. Id. at 794. See also infra notes 236‒67 and accompanying text.
183. See id. at 794 (stating that the ambiguous nature of the federal statute prevents the court
from “find[ing] that federal law preempts the State from providing for recovery of assets from both
spouses’ estates”); Thompson, 586 N.W. 2d at 851 (highlighting congressional intent to allow states
wide discretion in estate recovery).
184. 831 N.E.2d 641, 647 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (disagreeing with the “expanded definition” of
“estate” in Thompson).
185. Id. (“Because federal law does not provide an exception to the general rule prohibiting
recovery of medical assistance payments that would permit recovery from the estate of the
surviving spouse of a recipient, Illinois law to the contrary exceeds the authority granted under the
federal statute.”).
186. Id. at 642.
187. Id.
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for four years but died in 2001.188 At the time of her death she still owned the
home and the automobile, but both were sold following her death, with the home
selling for $69,641.89 and the automobile for $2,000.189 Upon her death the
state sought to recover $61,154.48, the cost of long-term care for her husband,
from her estate.190 The issue then arose as to whether the state could recover
from the non-recipient spouse’s estate for benefits paid on behalf of the recipient
spouse, or whether the claim was barred by the federal Medicaid statute.191
The Illinois Circuit Court held that the state recovery program was not
preempted by the federal statute.192 Federal law permits states to include in the
estate of a deceased recipient “any other real and personal property and other
assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of
death.”193 In this particular case, the non-recipient spouse inherited the house
through a joint tenancy nonprobate transfer.194 This is permitted under Illinois
law.195 The attorneys for the estate of the non-recipient spouse countered that
the expanded definition of what constitutes the estate only applies when the
decedent recipient spouse benefitted from state-sponsored long-term care
insurance. 196 The Illinois Circuit Court disagreed, holding that the statute
permitted estate recovery against assets which are part of the Illinois Probate
Estate of the Medicaid recipient, not only a recipient receiving state-sponsored
long-term care insurance.197
The estate of the non-recipient spouse appealed the decision of the Illinois
Circuit Court to the state’s appellate court.198 The appellate court held that the
state statute permits claims to be brought against any inpatient in a nursing
facility, the estate of such person, or the spouse of that person, but only upon the
death of that person’s spouse.199 Additionally, when determining the estate of
the surviving spouse the court began by acknowledging that federal law specifies

188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 643.
193. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (2012)).
194. Id. at 642‒43.
195. See 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-13 (West 2015). The Illinois statute is based on the
federal statute. Compare id. (“‘[E]state’ also includes any other real and personal property and
other assets in which the deceased person had any legal title or interest at time of his or her death .
. . including assets conveyed to a survivor . . . through joint tenancy . . . .”), with 42 U.S.C. § 13
1396p(b)(4)(B) (“[A]ny other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual
had any legal title or interest at the time of death . . . including such assets conveyed to a survivor .
. . through joint tenancy . . . .”).
196. Hines, 831 N.E.2d at 643 (noting that the broad definition of an estate may be used for
other situations, but is only required for recipients of state-sponsored long-term care insurance).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 642.
199. Id. at 644 (citing 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-13 (West 2015)).
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that states “may utilize the broad definition of the Medicaid recipient’s ‘estate’ .
. . but they are only required to apply that definition when the recipient benefitted
from . . . long-term care insurance coverage.”200 The appellate court noted that
the Illinois state statute defines the term “estate” in two different ways,201 with
both methods permitting a claim against the estate of a spouse of a Medicaid
recipient upon that surviving spouse’s death.202 The first way an estate may be
defined is to include “all real and personal property and other assets included
within the person’s estate, as that term is used in the Probate Act of 1975.”203
The second way provides an expanded definition of estate, consistent with the
federal provision.204 But, unlike the federal statute, the state statute provides the
following restrictive phrase:
[H]owever, in the case of a deceased person who has received (or is
entitled to receive) benefits under a long-term care insurance policy .
. . ‘estate’ also includes any other real and personal property and
other assets in which the deceased person had any legal title or
interest at the time of his or her death.205
The state statute, unlike its federal counterpart, included a provision that
appeared to condition the expanded definition of estate to those receiving longterm care insurance.206 Because the Medicaid recipient did not receive longterm care insurance, his estate at the time of his death must be defined by the
first, more limited definition of the term “estate.” 207 Because the home and
automobile did not pass to the surviving spouse under the more restrictive
version of the state statute, the property was beyond the reach of the state’s estate
recovery program.208 Put simply, the recipient’s estate under the Probate Act of
1975 did not include his home and automobile at the time of his death, and while
the more expansive definition would include these items, the statute’s broader
definition of estate was inapplicable because the recipient did not receive longterm care insurance as stipulated by the statute.209

200. Id. at 643. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (permitting states a definition of estate that
exceeds what is typically included in the probate estate).
201. Hines, 831 N.E.2d at 645.
202. Id. at 644 (citing 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/5-13 (West 2015)).
203. Id. (quoting 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/5-13). This portion of the state statute mirrors
the federal code provision. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(A).
204. Hines, 831 N.E.2d at 644‒45 (emphasizing that the language in the state statute allows a
broad definition of estate that is also found in the federal statute). See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B).
205. Hines, 831 N.E.2d at 644 (quoting 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-13).
206. Compare 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/5-13 (using the word “however” to limit the
expanded definition of “estate”), with 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (providing that no limitation on
how “estate” can be defined within the confines of the statutory language).
207. Hines, 831 N.E.2d at 645.
208. Id.
209. Id. (“Julius’s interest in the home and automobile would not be included in his ‘estate’
under the Probate Act. Those interests would be part of his more expansively defined estate, but
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Thwarted in its pursuit of the home and automobile through the state’s
expanded definition of estate, the Department of Public Aid then argued that the
manner by which the surviving spouse obtained the property from the recipient
spouse did not matter. 210 The state argued: “[B]ecause a claim against the
probate estate of the surviving spouse is permitted, it does not need to rely on
the broad definition of ‘estate’ to reach the property in the [spouse’s] estate.”211
But the appellate court disagreed, holding that recovery may be taken from the
recipient spouse’s estate at the surviving spouse’s death.212 This recovery is
limited to what the surviving spouse inherited from the estate of the recipient
spouse.213 Thus, since the Illinois statute defines the estate of the recipient in a
very narrow fashion, thereby excluding the home and automobile from passing
through the recipient spouse’s probate, these items are not now available to the
state estate recovery program from the estate of the non-recipient surviving
spouse.214 The problem results from the Illinois statute: the surviving spouse
did not receive the home and automobile in such a way as to make them available
to the state’s estate recovery program.215 Moreover, any efforts on behalf of the
state to attach these assets, the house, or the automobile, were prohibited by
federal preemption.216
The appellate court rejected the state’s argument that the state definition of
“estate” and the entire estate recovery program should be viewed more
expansively, thereby ignoring the limitation imposed by the word “however.”217
those cannot be reached by the Department because Julius does not fall within the second
situation.”).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. (“Recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse is, in fact, prohibited by federal
law.”).
213. Id. (agreeing that the petitioner was correct in the argument that “federal law limits the
State’s recovery to the estate of the individual Medicaid recipient”).
214. Id. (noting that the recipient did not fall under the more “expansive” definition, that his
“estate” would be limited to his “probate estate,” and because, as the petitioner argued, the state
could only recover from the Medicaid recipient’s estate per federal law, and not from the surviving
spouse’s estate). The court noted:
A plain reading of the statute discloses a blanket prohibition against states’ recovery of
medical assistance benefits, except in the three specified situations, and because that
initial prohibition is not lifted by an express authorization to recover medical assistance
benefits from the estate of a surviving spouse, Illinois law allowing just such a recovery
exceeds the authority granted states under the federal law.
Id. at 646.
215. Id. at 645 (discussing how the state statute’s “however” clause “implie[d] a distinction or
limitation” with regard to the definition of “estate”).
216. At least one state has ruled that “[t]he preemption of state law is not to be readily inferred.”
In re Estate of Mundell, 857 P.2d 631, 632 (Idaho 1993).
217. Hines, 831 N.E.2d at 645 (“The use of [the word] ‘however’ . . . implies a distinction . . .
[and n]othing in the record indicates [the recipient] received or was entitled to benefits under a
long-term-care insurance policy . . . [and his] ‘estate’ . . . would be limited to real and personal
property included within his probate estate; which, in this case, was none.”).
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It is understandable that courts preferring a more expansive approach to estate
recovery permit this so as to “[further] the broad pu[r]pose of providing for the
medical care of the needy,” acknowledging that “the greater amount recovered
by the state allows the state to have more funds to provide future services.”218
But the Illinois appellate court rejected any attempt to expand the terms of the
estate recovery program statute219 and held that the appropriate remedy is to
address the terms of the state statute that confined the expanded definition of
estate to those Medicaid recipients receiving long-term care insurance.220
Defining the estate in a manner to include both probate and nonprobate assets
is one task; another is to permit assets that have been transferred inter vivos to
any third party to become available for estate recovery. States grapple with
whether property may be traced to the ownership of a Medicaid recipient and his
or her spouse through a bona fide transfer during the lifetime of either.221 This
is the issue in the following material.
III. SECOND ISSUE: TRACING TRANSFERRED ASSETS
As has been recited in the preceding cases, federal law permits states to define
an estate in the traditional manner, under Part A of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4), as
including “all real and personal property and other assets included within the
individual’s estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law.”222 But then,
Part B of the provision permits a state, at its own option, to permit recovery from
any
real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had
any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such
interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign
of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common,
survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.223
Both sections of the federal legislation imply transfers occurring at death, but
the federal statute does not specifically encompass the situation involving
spouses when the institutionalized Medicaid recipient spouse transfers property
during his or her life to the non-recipient spouse under valid Medicaid transfer
218. Belshe v. Hope, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 917, 925 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). See also N.D. Dep’t of
Human Servs. v. Thompson, 586 N.W.2d 847, 851 (N.D. 1998) (“[The] broad purpose [of estate
recovery] is furthered more fully by allowing states to trace a recipient’s assets and recover them
from the estate of a recipient’s surviving spouse.”). But see In re Estate of Budney, 541 N.W.2d
245, 246 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the state statute was preempted by federal law when it
sought recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse without a preceding transfer).
219. Hines, 831 N.E.2d at 647 (“No definition of [the decedent’s] estate, no matter how broad,
can trump the statute’s absolute prohibition against recovery from any person not covered by an
express exception . . . . The federal statute clearly and unambiguously states that recovery of any
medical payments is generally not permitted.”).
220. Id.
221. See infra Part III.
222. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(A) (2012).
223. Id. § 1396p(b)(4)(B).
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rules.224 Later, the non-recipient spouse may opt for an inter vivos transfer of
that property, or retain that gifted property up to and including that spouse’s
death.225 Are the assets that passed to the non-recipient spouse included in the
terms of the estate recovery statute, even though they did not pass “through joint
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, [or] living trust”?226
Because of the terms of the federal statute, states are stymied by the question
of whether to include inter vivos transfers within the parameters of the estate
recovery program.227 The following two decisions offer contrasting views on
this issue.
A. The McCormick Approach: Other Arrangement
At least one court has held that a state may recover the value of inter vivos
transferred property from the estate of the surviving spouse of a recipient under
what is described as tracing of assets.228 In deciding In re Estate of Wirtz,229 the
Supreme Court of North Dakota adopted a policy expressing “wide latitude in
seeking Medicaid benefit recoveries,” 230 holding that the state may trace the
assets owned by the non-recipient spouse at death to the Medicaid recipient so
as to recover expenditures for Medicaid payments.231 The state court held that
tracing is permitted under the federal statute’s incorporation of an “other
arrangement” provision.232 Nonetheless, the court also ruled that collection may
not be made “from a surviving spouse’s separately-owned assets because of a
past obligation to pay a now deceased Medicaid recipient’s medical expenses as
necessaries, or recovery from the surviving spouse’s entire estate, including
assets not traceable from the recipient.”233 This limitation is not a surprise, as it
was also recited in an earlier decision, which held that any separately owned
assets in the recipient spouse’s estate are not available for tracing because they
were never assets in which the decedent recipient held an interest.234 The point
is a simple one: the federal recovery provisions permit recovery of assets passing
to a non-recipient spouse through probate or nonprobate transfer, and there is no
express incorporation of assets gifted to a non-recipient spouse. Nonetheless,
224. See id. § 1396p(b)(4)(A)‒(B).
225. Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(J).
226. Id. § 1396p(b)(4)(B).
227. See infra Part III.A‒B.
228. See In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882, 886 (N.D. 2000).
229. 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2000).
230. Id. at 886 (citing In re Estate of Thomson, 586 N.W.2d 847, 851 (N.D. 1998)).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 885‒86.
233. Id. at 886.
234. See In re Bergman, 688 N.W.2d 187, 191 (N.D. 2004) (holding that it was permissible for
the state to trace assets from the recipient to his spouse and then to the spouse’s son for purposes
of collection); but see In re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 71 (Minn. 2008) (holding that the state
may only recover from assets in which the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest at the time of the
recipient’s death).
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the Wirtz decision held that such power is given in the statute’s provision for
“other arrangement.”235
Tracing of assets has been allowed in other states, too. Support for a state’s
ability to trace resources in accordance with the federal Medicaid statute was
sustained in Idaho Department of Health & Welfare v. McCormick,236 decided
by the Supreme Court of Idaho.237 In McCormick, prior to marriage, a wife
owned a home as her separate property, but then during the marriage she
executed a quitclaim deed transferring the home to herself and her husband.238
Three years later, she executed a durable power of attorney naming her husband
as her attorney in fact.239 The next year the husband, operating under the durable
power, conveyed the house to himself as sole owner and then six weeks later
applied for Medicaid assistance to pay for his wife’s long-term care.240 The wife
qualified for Medicaid assistance and more than $106,251.08 was paid before
she died four years after qualification.241
The husband predeceased his wife by one year and his daughter was appointed
as the personal representative of his estate; the only asset was the house shared
by the couple and previously transferred. 242 The house was appraised at
$81,688.95.243 The wife was still receiving long-term care benefits when the
husband died, so the state filed a claim against the house in which the husband
was living under the state’s estate recovery program, targeting “any property or
estate which, at any time, had been the community property of the decedent and
decedent’s spouse, or which had been the property of decedent’s spouse.”244
The magistrate court denied the state’s claim against the husband’s house
because the wife (the Medicaid recipient) would have no interest in the house at
the time of her death; the district court affirmed this decision, holding that if
recovery were allowed it would conflict with federal law.245 Such a holding is
not inconsistent with other state courts that have held that the recipient spouse
must have an interest in the property at the time of his or her death in order to
make the property subject to estate recovery and be within the parameters of

235. Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 885.
236. 283 P.3d 785 (Idaho 2012).
237. Id. at 794. See also In re Estate of Peterson, 340 P.3d 1143, 1151‒52 (Idaho 2014)
(holding that an entire inter vivos transfer of interest by a Medicaid recipient was available for
estate recovery, not just the life estate); In re Estate of Wiggins, 306 P.3d 201, 203, 209 (Idaho
2013) (finding that the state may trace community assets that had been transmuted into separate
property of the non-recipient spouse for Medicaid eligibility).
238. McCormick, 283 P.3d at 786.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 787 (citing IDAHO CODE ANN. § 56-218 (West 2015)).
245. Id. at 787‒88.
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federal law.246 But the McCormick court formulated a different approach, one
that permits and recognizes that “excess resources saved by virtue of Medicaid
funds are meant to be tracked and recovered.”247
On appeal from the decision of the magistrate court, the Idaho Supreme Court
ruled that federal Medicaid rules should be read broadly, distinguishing it from
other courts that interpreted the language of the Medicaid statute as less
inclusive.248 The court held that a broad interpretation of the Medicaid statute
includes an appreciation of “the Medicaid program’s overall purpose,” 249
prompting an expansive definition of “estate” to include “the value of the assets
of the estate that had been . . . community property, or the deceased participant’s
share of the separate property, and jointly owned property” of a deceased
Medicaid recipient or that person’s spouse.250 Based on this broad interpretation
of the Medicaid statute, it follows that the federal legislation “seems to
specifically address resources in which the recipient had an interest at one time
but disposed of through her own actions or those of her spouse—such as a
lifetime transfer of a home.”251 The court’s ruling thus permits estate recovery
efforts to reach assets that had been transferred by gift during the course of the
recipient’s life to the recipient’s surviving spouse or others.252
In the case of In re Estate of Barg,253 the Supreme Court of Minnesota did not
permit this.254 Instead, that court restricted recovery to assets actually owned by
the recipient at the time of the recipient’s death, or that passed at the recipient’s
death to a surviving spouse through probate or nonprobate transfer.255 In either
situation, the state’s estate recovery is not preempted by federal law because the
asset is owned by the recipient at the time of death.256
The reasons behind the McCormick court’s decision are as follows. First,
federal legislation mandating estate recovery programs should be read in an
expansive fashion, truly making Medicaid “the payer of last resort.”257 Second,
the federal statute’s reference to other assets provides the basis for recovering
those assets, even though these assets may have to be tracked or traced through

246. See, e.g., In re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 71 (Minn. 2008).
247. McCormick, 283 P.3d at 788.
248. Id. at 793 (“Thus, while the Barg court seemed convinced that the language [of the
Medicaid statute] excluded lifetime transfers, we find it to be ambiguously inclusive.”).
249. Id. at 789. See also id. at 794 (“At the very least, it renders the proper scope of recovery
somewhat ambiguous, in which case this Court may look to the overall purpose of the statute for
guidance.”).
250. Id. at 790 (citing IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 16.03.09.905 (2015)).
251. Id. at 793 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(1) (2012)).
252. Id. at 794‒95.
253. 752 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 2008).
254. Id. at 71‒72.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 73–74.
257. McCormick, 283 P.3d at 788.
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the estate of the recipient’s spouse.258 Third, the federal reference to “other
arrangements” may be read to include assets that were held by the recipient but
transferred to a spouse before death, during lifetime, and therefore not present at
the time of death.259 Fourth, the court stated:
[The] ambiguously inclusive language in the definition of “estate”—
purporting to extend recovery to assets transferred by “other
arrangements”—coupled with the definition of “assets”—plainly
including the resources of the recipient’s spouse as well as assets the
recipient disposed of before death—calls into question the Estate’s
strict reliance on the phrase “at the time of death.”260
Finally, the court’s reluctance to hold that federal law preempts state law, plus
the overall purpose of Medicaid estate recovery, permits recovery from assets
transferred during lifetime and not available at the time of death.261
By holding that the federal Medicaid statutes must be read in an expansive
manner, the Supreme Court of Idaho in its McCormick decision joined the
reasoning of the Supreme Court of North Dakota in Wirtz.262 The courts in both
cases held that Congress intended “to allow states to trace the assets of recipients
of medical assistance and recover the benefits paid when the recipient’s
surviving spouse dies.”263 At least, as the court concluded in McCormick, this
is an acceptable rationale upon which state courts may act when there is no
explicit preemption pronouncement by Congress.264 The court summarized its
holding and rationale with the following: “This Court has been loathe in the past
to surrender State sovereignty to the federal government and has found
preemption of our State’s duly enacted laws only where the congressional intent
is rather clear.”265 Implicitly, the court concluded that it could read the federal
statute in an expansive manner to permit tracing inter vivos gifts to their source,
regardless of whether these assets were owned by a recipient of long-term
benefits at the time of death. 266 In addition to applying a more expansive
definition of federal Medicaid statutes, the McCormick decision differed because
it also defined “assets” as encompassing all resources of both spouses, permitted

258. Id. at 791 (referencing the Idaho estate recovery statute, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 56-218(4)
(West 2015), and Idaho’s regulation permitting “recovery through the recipient’s spouse’s estate
not only of assets in which the recipient holds an interest at the time of death, but also ‘assets of the
estate that had been, at any time after October 1, 1993, community property’”) (citing IDAHO
ADMIN. CODE r. 16.03.09.905.01 (West 2015)).
259. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (2012)).
260. Id. at 794 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(b)(4), (h)(1)).
261. Id.
262. Id. (citing In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882, 886 (N.D. 2000)).
263. Id. at 794 (citing Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 886 (N.D. 2000)).
264. Id.
265. Id. (citing Christian v. Mason, 219 P.3d 473, 476 (Idaho 2009)).
266. Id. at 794‒95.
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estate recovery to reach assets passing at the time of death, and traced assets that
passed during lifetime.267
B. The Barg Approach: Preemption
Not all courts are willing to apply a more expansive view of state authority.268
One court holding an opposite view to the McCormick court is the Supreme
Court of Minnesota in its decision of In re Estate of Barg.269 The Barg decision
relied upon the express wording of the federal statute, resulting in federal
preemption of expansive construction by state courts.270 Specifically, in Barg,
the court held that Medicaid law preempts any expansive definition or practice
aimed at recovering “the value of the assets of the estate that were marital
property or jointly owned property at any time during the marriage.”271 If these
assets were transferred during lifetime and not available at death, federal law
preempts estate recovery.272 The facts of the case involved spouses, married in
1948 and remaining married until the wife’s death in 2004, a period of fifty-six
years.273 During the 1960s, the couple took joint tenancy title of two parcels of
real property in Minnesota and owned them when the wife applied for Medicaid
benefits in 2001.274 Her application was approved, and shortly thereafter she
transferred her interest in the real estate to her husband; she also surrendered any
interest in certificates of deposit held at the local bank.275 Subsequently, the
husband executed a last will and testament “leaving his estate to his surviving
descendants, and making no provision for his wife.”276

267. Id. at 793 (noting that “[a]lthough the Barg court analyzed the definition of ‘estate’ in 42
U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B), it did not address the definition of ‘assets’ in section 1396p(h)(1)”). See
also id. at 794‒95 (allowing estate recovery for assets passing at time of death and tracing assets
that passed in lifetime).
268. See, e.g., In re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 65‒66 (Minn. 2008). See also In re Craig,
624 N.E.2d 1003 (N.Y. 1993) (stating that federal law “gives the States, at their option, the power
to recover against a spouse’s estate, but only against the recipient’s assets that were conveyed
through joint tenancy and other specified forms of survivorship”).
269. 752 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 2008). See also Gheen v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Health, Div. of
Healthcare Fin./Equalitycare, 326 P.3d 918, 923 (Wyo. 2014) (holding that the statutory definition
of “estate” does not include property transferred prior to death).
270. See Barg, 752 N.W.2d at 69‒71. The court noted, “[the government’s] argument would
take us too far down the path of favoring the purpose of the law at the expense of the plain meaning
of its language,” id. at 69, that “other arrangement” means “arrangements other than those expressly
listed that also convey assets at the time of the Medicaid recipient’s death,” id. at 70, and that “the
language of the federal law clearly limits [an] expansion to assets in which the recipient had an
interest at the time of her death.” id. at 71.
271. Id. at 68 (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256B.15, subdiv. 2 (West 2015)).
272. Id. at 73‒74.
273. Id. at 57.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
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The wife died in 2004 after receiving $108,413.53 in Medicaid benefits; the
husband died five months later without ever having received similar benefits
himself.277 Two months after the husband’s death, the state filed a claim against
his estate to recover the full amount of the Medicaid benefits paid on behalf of
the decedent’s wife, “arguing that the entire value of the marital property, both
the homestead and the certificates of deposit, was subject to its claim because
[the wife’s] joint tenancy interest gave her a right to use of the entire
property.”278 This, the state argued, was consistent with Minnesota’s recovery
statute that permitted the state to recover marital property owned as joint tenancy
at any time during the marriage.279 The district court held that the wife’s interest
in the home was limited “because she had conveyed it to her husband before her
death, evaluated her interest as a life estate, and upheld the partial
disallowance.”280 The state appealed, arguing that it was entitled to the full
value of the property, but the appellate court ruled that the wife had only a joint
interest in the property, equivalent to one-half the value, and thereby limited
recovery. 281 The state then appealed to the Supreme Court of Minnesota,
seeking full recovery of the transferred property.282
The issue for the state’s highest court was whether federal legislation required,
for purposes of recovery, that any interest in marital or jointly owned property
be held by the recipient spouse at the time of his or her death.283 The facts
indicate that the wife did not own the property at the time of her death, and the
state’s court of appeals held that this was required, 284 based on that court’s
reading of the federal statute. 285 However, the state argued that there was
“nothing in the federal statute prior to the 1993 amendments that limited the
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 64‒65. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256B.15, subd. 2 (West 2015) (“Recovery of
medical assistance expenses in the nonrecipient surviving spouse’s estate is limited to the value of
the assets of the estate that were marital property or jointly owned property at any time during the
marriage.”).
280. Barg, 752 N.W.2d at 56.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 58.
283. Id. at 62–63 (reciting the broader three issues).
284. Id. (citing In re Estate of Barg, 722 N.W.2d 492, 497 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006); In re Estate
of Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d 709, 714 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002)).
285. Barg, 752 N.W.2d at 62. The court stated:
The court of appeals held that a partial disallowance of the County’s claim was proper,
relying on its earlier decision in Gullberg that the broad [state] authorization . . . for
recovery up to the value of all assets of the estate that were marital property or jointly
owned at any time during the marriage was partially preempted by the 1993 amendments
to the federal law that limit the expanded estate to assets in which the recipient spouse
had a legal interest at the time of her death.
Id. (citing Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 495‒96). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (2012) (stating that
the “estate,” for recovery purposes, “may include . . . any other . . . assets in which the individual
had any legal title or interest at the time of death”).
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states’ authority to pursue estate recovery of Medicaid benefits paid, and that the
1993 amendments were intended by Congress to expand state options, not limit
them.” 286 In response, the estate of the surviving spouse argued that “there
should be no recovery here because [the recipient] had no legal interest in the
homestead or the certificates of deposit at the time of her death, having conveyed
her interest to her husband during her lifetime.”287
Reviewing both arguments, the state supreme court looked first to the fact that
federal law permits recovery only from the recipient’s estate and not from the
separate estate of the surviving spouse.288 States that permit recovery from the
surviving spouse’s estate—in spite of contrary language in the federal statute—
must do so because these states conclude that the assets passed to the surviving
spouse289 and would therefore come within the terms of the federal legislation,
even though recovery cannot be sought until after the surviving spouse’s
death.290 Thus, federal law would not preempt the state from recovering assets
that the surviving spouse obtained from the recipient as a result of inheritance
through probate or nonprobate transfer.291 But this would not encompass all
forms of transfer.292 Would inter vivos transfers, illustrated by the facts of the
Barg decision, be available for estate recovery? The Minnesota statute would
permit recovering from the surviving spouse’s estate “the value of the assets of
the estate that were marital property or jointly owned property at any time during
the marriage.”293 Does preemption apply to a state statute permitting recovery
from transfers at “any time during the marriage”?294 This is the issue considered
in Barg.
The court held that federal law preempts the state statute’s warrant to recover
from assets or interests owned at any time during the marriage.295 The court
“conclude[d] that there is no principled basis on which to interpret the federal
law to allow recovery of assets in which the Medicaid recipient did not have an
interest at the time of her death.”296 The facts of this case illustrate a Medicaid
recipient who transferred her joint tenancy interest in her real estate and

286. Barg, 752 N.W.2d at 62.
287. Id. at 62‒63.
288. Id. at 64 (citing Hines v. Dep’t of Pub. Aid, 850 N.E.2d 148, 152‒53 (Ill. 2006)).
289. Id. at 66 (citing Bucholtz v. Belshe, 114 F.3d 923, 927 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that federal
law did not preempt state recovery of assets in the recipient’s estate and any recipient of the property
by distribution or survival)).
290. Id.
291. Id. at 68.
292. Id.
293. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256B.15, subdiv. 2 (West 2015) (emphasis added).
294. Barg, 752 N.W.2d at 69 (citing In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882, 885‒86 (N.D.
2000)) (stating that Wirtz was an example of one state that has held that federal preemption does
not apply to recovery from transfers at any time during the marriage, not just through survivorship).
295. Id. at 71.
296. Id.
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surrendered any interest in her certificates of deposit during her lifetime. 297
Thus, these assets were not “assets in which the individual had any legal title or
interest at the time of death.”298 The Barg court rejected the suggestion that the
federal statute’s inclusion of “or other arrangement” when coupled with
statutory ambiguity and congressional purpose to permit state recovery justify
an expansive approach permitting recovery from all assets in a surviving
spouse’s estate no matter how such assets acquired were from a recipient’s
estate. 299 Recognizing that the state’s appeals court ruled that the recipient
spouse did retain a joint interest in the lifetime transfer as an “other
arrangement,” the state’s highest court held that it could accept this
conclusion.300 The court stated:
The language of section 1396p(b)(4) requires that any interest
included in the expanded estate must be one in which the Medicaid
recipient had an interest at the time of her death, not one that was
previously conveyed. We conclude that [the recipient] did not retain
a joint tenancy interest in the property at the time of her death, because
that interest was effectively and legally transferred before her death.301
Furthermore, the state’s Medicaid estate recovery statute “is preempted to the
extent that it allows recovery from assets in which the deceased Medicaid
recipient did not have a legal interest at the time of death, and to the extent that
it permits recovery beyond the extent of the recipient’s interest.”302
All of the decisions cited, Wirtz, McCormick, and Barg, have a common
element: they seek to decipher the language of the federal Medicaid statute to
determine if the federal statute preempts state efforts to recover from a recipient
spouse’s estate the value of assets of the estate that were marital property or
jointly owned property at any time during the marriage.303 Barg held that estate

297. Id. at 57.
298. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (2012).
299. Barg, 752 N.W.2d at 69 (suggesting that the “argument would take us too far down the
path of favoring the purpose of the law at the expense of the plain meaning of its language”).
300. Id. at 71‒72.
301. Id. at 72.
302. Id. at 73–74.
303. See, e.g., Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785, 791 (Idaho
2012). At issue is the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4):
For purposes of this subsection, the term “estate”, with respect to a deceased individual
. . . (B) may include, at the option of the State . . . any other real and personal property
and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of
death[,] . . . including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased
individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living
trust, or other arrangement.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (2012). See also In re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 63 (Minn. 2008);
In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882, 884‒86 (N.D. 2000).
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recovery does not reach everything, but only to property in which there is a legal
interest at the time of death.304
Other courts have held similarly, one being the Supreme Court of
Wyoming.305 The Wyoming decision involved a residence and a farm owned
by a married couple as tenants by the entirety.306 The husband died intestate;
one-half of the property went to his wife, and the other half was divided between
their two sons.307 Subsequently, the mother transferred her one-half interest in
the property to her sons, thereby relinquishing any ownership, but she did not
tell the sons what she had done.308 Four years later, one of the sons applied for
Medicaid benefits for his mother and listed the properties in which he thought
the mother still had an interest.309 The mother was approved for Medicaid and
received approximately $10,508.54 in benefits prior to her death.310 Then, after
her death, the sons discovered the quitclaim deeds for the properties and
recorded them so they did not form part of their mother’s estate.311 Nonetheless,
the state filed a lien against the properties to recover for the Medicaid
expenditures,312 asserting that the mother had an interest in the properties at the
time of her death.313 The district court agreed, approving the state’s lien under
the estate recovery program.314
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the state’s statute
pertaining to estate recovery and the corresponding definition of what constitutes
an estate.315 The court concluded that “the statutory definition of estate does not
include property properly transferred prior to death.”316 However, Gheen held
that the mother did not effectively transfer the properties to the sons by quitclaim
deeds prior to her death.317 Thus, because the Medicaid recipient, the mother,
304. Barg, 752 N.W.2d at 70 (“Inclusion in the list of examples of ‘such assets’ is predicated
on the recipient having a legal interest at the time of death.”).
305. Gheen v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Health, Div. of Healthcare Fin./Equalitycare, 326 P.3d
918, 923 (Wyo. 2014) (discussing WYO. STAT. ANN. § 42-4-206(g)(ii) (West 2015), and noting
that the state’s definition of “estate” included “other assets in which the individual had any legal
title or interest at the time of death”).
306. Id. at 921.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 922.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 922‒23. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 42-4-207(j) (West 2015) (providing for filing of
liens against the property of an estate); id. § 42-4-206(g) (defining “estate” for purposes of
recovery).
316. Gheen, 326 P.3d at 923 (citing Estate of Marusich v. State, ex rel., Dep’t of Health, Office
of Fin./Equalitycare, 313 P.3d 1272, 1277‒78 (Wyo. 2013)).
317. Id. at 926 (“The deeds were not, therefore, effective to reduce or eliminate [the mother’s]
ownership or control of the assets.”).
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had an interest in the property at the time of her death, the property formed part
of her estate subject to estate recovery in accordance with the state statute.318
Barg and Gheen both rely on the wording of the federal statute.319 When the
federal statute defines the estate from which estate recovery may be taken, the
statute refers to assets at the time of death or assets conveyed by a deceased
individual.320 Such precision, according to these courts, offers no opportunity
for an expansive reading of estate recovery.321 The Barg court concluded that
“there is no principled basis on which to interpret the federal law to allow
recovery of assets in which the Medicaid recipient did not have an interest at the
time of her death.”322 Other courts, Wirtz and McCormick among them, chose
not to employ such a restrictive interpretation of the federal statute. 323
McCormick, for example, scrutinizing the same statute, concluded that the
statute “contain[s] ambiguities” and permitted a more expansive definition. 324
Thus, McCormick looked to another section of the federal statute and applied
the definition of “assets” to the “estate” from which recovery may be
obtained.325 The court concluded that if the definition of estate extended to
assets conveyed through other arrangements, there should be no strict
requirement that estate assets be restricted to time of death.326 Instead, the assets
may be traced to an interest some time previously.327 The issue raised in all of
these cases could be resolved by modifying the federal statute.

318. Id.
319. See In re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 70 (Minn. 2008) (stating that the court “return[s]
again to the language of the federal statute”); Gheen, 326 P.3d at 922‒23.
320. See Barg, 752 N.W.2d at 70 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (2012)) (stating that “[t]he
federal optional definition of ‘estate’ allows inclusion of ‘any other real and personal property and
other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death . . . including
such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased”).
321. See id. at 70; Gheen, 326 P.3d at 922‒23.
322. Barg, 752 N.W.2d at 71.
323. See Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785, 793 (Idaho 2012)
(stating than an “expansive definition of ‘assets,’ which is imported into section 1396p(b)(4)’s
definition of ‘estate’ by the definition’s use of that term, well supports Idaho’s provision for
recovery from the estates of both spouses”); In re Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882, 885 (N.D. 2000) (stating
that “[r]ecovery is not limited to assets in the surviving spouse’s estate that the Medicaid recipient
had legal title to and conveyed through joint tenancy, tenancy-in-common, survivorship, life estate,
or living trust”).
324. McCormick, 283 P.3d at 793. The court concluded, “[a]lthough the juxtaposition of the
language ‘at the time of death’ and the other, more inclusive language in the statute is perplexing,
we find that ambiguity insufficient to overcome our presumption against preemption of state law.”
Id. at 794.
325. Id. at 793. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(1) (2012) (“The term ‘assets’ . . . includes all income
and resources of the individual and of the individual’s spouse, including any income or resources
which the individual or such individual’s spouse is entitled to but does not receive because of
action—(A) by the individual or such individual’s spouse . . . .”).
326. See McCormick, 283 P.3d at 794.
327. See id.
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IV. THIRD ISSUE: SPOUSAL ANNUITIES
A. Annuity Planning
The DRA continued the practice of treating the separate income and assets of
the non-institutionalized spouse as exempt from consideration when establishing
eligibility for the other spouse’s long-term care.328 In addition, in determining
eligibility for the institutionalized spouse, the community spouse’s income is not
considered.329 The MCCA created the “minimum monthly maintenance needs
allowance” to permit the non-recipient spouse to receive a continuous flow of
income.330 The level of income is based on a combination of a basic allowance
and excess shelter allowance. 331 Typically, the non-institutionalized spouse
would purchase an annuity with non-exempt assets so as to create an income
flow that would be exempt from consideration.332 Such a practice is common
and permits the non-institutionalized spouse to continue a sustainable lifestyle,
living off income generated from assets that would otherwise have to be depleted
before the institutionalized spouse would qualify for Medicaid.333 Any annuity
contract purchased by the non-recipient spouse had to specify that the state
would be the preferred remainder beneficiary to the extent necessary to pay for
expenditures made on behalf of the institutionalized spouse.334
Elder law attorneys often employ annuities whenever there are excess assets,
and the annuity can safeguard funds for the non-institutionalized spouse. 335
Excess occurs when applying for benefits. 336 Medicaid permits a non328. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(b)(1). For statutory provisions pertaining to disclosure and treatment
of annuities, see id. § 1396p(e).
329. See id. § 1396r-5(b)(1).
330. Id. § 1396r-5(d)(3)(A).
331. Id.
332. See, e.g., Hutcherson v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys. Admin., 667 F.3d 1066,
1069 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding as acceptable a spouse converting his or her assets into an annuity
and thus making the annuity exempt from consideration for the other spouse’s eligibility for
Medicaid long-term care). Medicaid specifically allows the community spouse to purchase an
annuity. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(F)(i).
333. See Hutcherson, 667 F.3d at 1071. The court pointed out:
[I]f [the husband], instead of purchasing the annuity, attempted to transfer funds to
Appellant, [the wife] would have been ineligible for Medicaid for the approximate length
of time that the funds could have covered [her] medical costs. By purchasing an annuity,
[the husband] avoided this transfer penalty. . . . [The husband] was entitled to collect
monthly payments from the annuity for as long as he lived.
Id. at 1072.
334. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(2).
335. For a description of the practice, see Sean R. Bleck, Barbara Isenhour & John A. Miller,
Preserving Wealth and Inheritance Through Medicaid Planning for Long-Term Care, 17 MICH.
ST. U. J. MED. & L. 153, 193‒94 (2013).
336. See id. at 160 (noting that “the applicant must spend down the excess income over the
Medicaid rate on medical costs before he or she will be eligible for Medicaid coverage for other
medical expenses”).
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institutionalized spouse to exempt certain specified assets, but there may be
excess assets that would have to be spent prior to the institutionalized spouse
obtaining Medicaid eligibility.337 Rather than spend the assets on institutional
care, elder law practitioners recommend purchasing an annuity to provide
income to the non-institutionalized spouse. 338 This income would not be
considered an asset because the MCCA provides that “[d]uring any month in
which an institutionalized spouse is in the institution . . . no income of the
community spouse shall be deemed available to the institutionalized spouse.”339
The annuity would have to be “actuarially sound” and “irrevocable and
nonassignable,” and the rates would have to correspond with tables maintained
by the Social Security Administration.340 Most often any annuity would be for
a term of years, naming the state as the preferred remainder beneficiary after any
minor or disabled child.341
B. Transferable Assets
Illustrating both the process and the challenge of annuities is Lopes v.
Department of Social Services. 342 The facts involved a husband and wife
applying for Medicaid for the husband.343 The MCCA specified that the state,
when considering an application from a married couple, could exclude certain
community spouse funds and assets from calculations of total resources.344 The
337. Id. at 194‒95.
338. Id.
339. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(b)(1).
340. Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(G)(ii)(I)‒(II). In addition, the annuity would have to “provide[] for
payments in equal amounts during the term of the annuity, with no deferral and no balloon payments
made.” Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(G)(ii)(III).
341. See, e.g., Hutcherson v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys. Admin., 667 F.3d 1066,
1067 (9th Cir. 2012). In Hutcherson, the husband purchased an annuity in his name with the excess
assets he and his wife owned so that the money would be exempt and the wife would qualify for
Medicaid assistance. Id. at 1067–68. The husband purchased an annuity for $100,000 and it paid
a monthly amount of $2,781.63 for thirty-six months; the state was named as the remainder
beneficiary and the daughter was named the second beneficiary. Id. The husband died and there
was a remainder value in the annuity of approximately $75,000. Id. As the first remainder
beneficiary the state collected the annuity benefits, having already paid $23,840.51 in benefits for
the wife’s care; the state applied what it received from the annuity first to the ongoing cost of the
wife’s care and the excess of $228.71 towards the past expenditure. Id. When the wife ceased
receiving Medicaid assistance, the annuity benefit was used to pay off the remaining balance on the
wife’s care. Id. Once the state was paid $60,840.51, it released its claim against the annuity, and
the daughter was entitled to the remaining amount. Id. But the daughter challenged the state’s
ability to take from the annuity, arguing that the state’s recovery was limited to expenses incurred
on behalf of the husband and the husband had never been institutionalized and had no expenses.
Id. The district court disagreed and held that the plain meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(F)(i)
allows the state to reach a deceased non-institutionalized spouse’s annuity for costs incurred on
behalf of an institutionalized spouse. Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 1072.
342. 696 F.3d 180, 182‒83 (2d Cir. 2012).
343. Id. at 183.
344. Id. at 182 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(2)(A)).
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wife applied for benefits, but the applicable community spouse resource
allowance was approximately $180,000, and there were assets in excess of this
amount totaling $160,000.345 To reduce this excess amount and thereby qualify
for Medicaid benefits, the wife “purchased an immediate single premium
annuity with a premium of $166,878.99” that “provided for monthly payments
of $2,340.83 over a period of approximately six years.”346 The annuity contract
specified that the annuity was “not transferable” and rights could not “be
assigned, sold, anticipated, alienated, commuted, surrendered, cashed in or
pledged as security for a loan.”347 Even though a third party was willing to
purchase the six-year payment stream for approximately $99,000, the wife
“maintained that the annuity was a ‘fixed income stream’” and not an asset that
needed to be liquidated to pay for her husband’s institutional care.348 But the
state’s Medicaid official denied the husband’s application for benefits because
it was technically possible for the wife to sell the annuity income stream to a
third party, making the annuity transferrable.349 The wife appealed the decision,
and the district court agreed with the wife, holding that the wife did not have the
power to alienate or transfer her interest.350 The Medicaid official appealed, and
the appellate court agreed to consider whether the annuity is non-assignable and,
if so, “whether it is [to be considered as] income or a resource.”351
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the facts and held
that:
The language of the relevant regulations, as clarified in the
[Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Program Operations Manual
System (POMS)] and in [the United States Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS)]’s amicus brief, convinces us that the income
stream from Lopes’s annuity is properly considered income, not a
resource, because the annuity is non-assignable.352

345. Id. at 183.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. (stating that the Medicaid official relied upon Social Services’ Uniform Policy Manual
§ 4030.47, which provides that in determining benefit eligibility, “the right to receive income from
an annuity is regarded as an available asset, whether or not the annuity is assignable”) (quoting
CONN. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., UNIFORM POLICY MANUAL § 4030.47 (2007)).
350. Id. at 183‒84.
351. Id. at 184.
352. Id. Other decisions support the rationale of Lopes, that any annuity is non-assignable if
the terms of the contract forbid “cashing-in” the annuity even when there is a willing purchaser.
See, e.g., James v. Richman, 547 F.3d 214, 218 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Even if the Department is correct
that [the wife] has the de facto ability to effect a change in ownership of the annuity, she cannot do
so without breaching the contract and incurring legal liability. Accordingly, the annuity cannot be
treated as an available resource.”); Geston v. Olson, 857 F. Supp. 2d 863, 876‒77 (D.N.D. 2012)
(noting that the annuity cannot be revoked, assigned, or liquidated); but see Estate of Gross v. N.D.
Dep’t of Human Servs., 687 N.W.2d 460, 465 (N.D. 2004) (“We conclude there was evidence from
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The crucial factor for the court was the contractual terms by which the wife
agreed to surrender her right to assign her payments under the annuity.353 The
court held that “[u]nder [state] law, this language suffices to make the annuity
non-assignable.”354 But the Medicaid official remained adamant that an owner
of a non-assignable annuity has the effective right, authority, or power to
liquidate the asset as long as there is a prospective purchaser for the payment
stream.355 Nonetheless, the Second Circuit likened the annuity purchased in this
case to other forms of unearned income that are classified as non-assignable even
though there may be a prospective purchaser. 356 Because SSI regulations
supported the view that various other forms of income streams, such as social
security benefits and disability benefits can be considered as non-assignable, it
was possible that this annuity was non-assignable, too.357
As an alternative rationale for denying exemption to the annuity, the Medicaid
official argued that because the wife purchased the annuity shortly before
applying for Medicaid benefits for her husband, the cash resource should still be
considered an asset or a resource held by the applicant within the sixty-month
period, thereby disqualifying the husband.358 But the Second Circuit declined
to classify the cash that was used to purchase the annuity as a resource. 359
Instead, the court looked to the federal statute that permits states to exclude
which a reasoning mind could reasonably conclude there was a market for the monthly payments
from this annuity.”).
353. Lopes, 696 F.3d at 185 (“The [terms] strip[] Lopes of both the right to assign her payments
under the annuity . . . and the power to assign her payments . . . .”).
354. Id.
355. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.1201(a)(1) (2015)) (“[A] community spouse’s asset is a
resource ‘if an individual has the right, authority or power to liquidate the property, or his or her
share of the property.’”).
356. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.1121(a)) (“Some types of unearned income are . . . annuities,
pensions, and other periodic payments. This unearned income is usually related to prior work or
service. It includes, for example, private pensions, social security benefits, disability benefits,
veterans benefits, worker’s compensation, railroad retirement annuities[,] and unemployment
insurance benefits.”).
357. Id.
358. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.1207(e)) (“[I]f an individual sells, exchanges or replaces a
resource, the receipts are not income. They are still considered to be a resource.”). See also id.
(citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.1103(a)) (providing that “what you receive from the sale or exchange of
your own property is not income; it remains a resource”); id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.1103(c))
(stating that “receipts from the sale, exchange, or replacement of a resource are not income but are
resources that have changed their form”).
359. See id. at 186 (“Nor do these regulations establish that Lopes’s annuity is a resource
merely because it existed in the form of cash shortly before she applied for Medicaid.”). The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit requested an amicus brief from the Department of Health
and Human Services expressing an opinion on the issue raised. See Brief for U.S. Dep’t of Health
& Human Servs. as Amici Curiae as requested by the court at 1, Lopes v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 696
F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 10-3741-cv), 2011 WL 6742495, at *1. The amicus brief formed the
basis of the court’s rationale, that the annuity should not be considered as a disqualifying resource.
Lopes, 696 F.3d at 184. The amicus brief discussed similarities with other annuities under the SSI.
See Brief for U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., supra at 11‒13.
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certain community spouse funds and assets from the calculation of total
resources. 360 Specifically, “no income of the community spouse shall be
deemed available to the institutionalized spouse.”361 Overall, the court relied
upon the DRA, the amicus brief of HHS, and the POMS.362 These support the
policy of “protecting community spouses from impoverishment by permitting
[these spouses] to retain some of their assets, while recognizing that couples
must apply a fair share of their combined resources toward the cost of care before
receiving benefits.”363 Therefore, as long as the spouses purchase an annuity
and meet the requirements of a bona fide annuity under the DRA, “the
placements of assets in an annuity will not be considered a suspect ‘transfer of
assets’ exposing an applicant to certain penalties.”364 This is true even if the
spouses purchase an annuity during the sixty-month period prior to eligibility,
because “a non-assignable annuity is not a resource for purposes of determining
Medicaid eligibility.”365
Annuities are valid estate planning tools in some states, but suspect in others
because of the issues raised in the Lopes decision.366 Those issues involved
whether the annuity is a transferable resource and whether the conversion of
assets into an annuity during the sixty-month period prior to eligibility is a

360. Lopes, 696 F.3d at 186 (noting that “[t]he Medicaid program categorically excludes
certain assets, such as a home and one automobile, from consideration as resources”) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(5) (2012)).
361. Id. at 182 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(b)(1)).
362. See id. at 188.
363. Id. Section 405 of the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 amended the annuity
provisions of the DRA, substituting “institutionalized individual” for “individual” when
considering whose expenses must be recoverable from an annuity when purchasing an annuity and
then not be considered a transfer within the look-back period. Tax Relief and Healthcare Act of
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, 120 Stat. 2922, 2998. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
provides added clarification at SMDL 06-018. Letter from Dennis G. Smith, supra note 36.
364. Lopes, 696 F.3d at 188 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(18), 1396p(c)(1)(A), (e)(1)); but see
Cook v. Bottesch, 740 S.E.2d 752, 756 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013), rev’d on other grounds, Cook v.
Glover, 761 S.E.2d 267 (Ga. 2014) (holding that “annuities benefiting community spouses must
name the State as a remainder beneficiary to avoid automatically being treated as the disposal of an
asset for less than fair market value”). The Supreme Court of Georgia in Glover upheld the asset
transfer penalty that the appeals court in Bottesch overturned. Glover, 761 S.E.2d at 272.
365. Lopes, 696 F.3d at 188 (joining other circuits). See Morris v. Okla. Dep’t of Human
Servs., 685 F.3d 925, 932‒34 (10th Cir. 2012) (discussing the conditions under which a spouse
may purchase an annuity without it counting as a resource); Hutcherson v. Ariz. Health Care Cost
Containment Sys. Admin., 667 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The Medicaid statute allows the
community spouse to purchase an annuity . . . . allowing the spouse to convert his or her assets,
which are considered in determining the institutionalized spouse’s eligibility, to income, which is
not considered.”); contra Glover, 761 S.E.2d at 268, 272 (upholding an asset transfer penalty where
the annuity did not name the state as a remainder beneficiary).
366. See, e.g., Estate of Gross v. N.D. Dep’t of Human Servs., 687 N.W.2d 460, 463‒64 (N.D.
2004).
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disqualifying event.367 The Lopes decision relies heavily on the amicus brief of
HHS.368 The Department’s opinion is that an annuity should not be considered
as a countable resource, referencing the similar status of annuities for purposes
of social security. 369 Nonetheless, the lack of uniformity among the states
hampers planning by elder law attorneys and receipt of possible benefits by
potential long-term care beneficiaries.370
C. Loans to Family Members
Similar to annuities is the practice of loaning assets to family members,
particularly children. The DRA requires loans to be actuarially valid and
repayable in equal installments, and that there be no provision for cancelling the
loan upon the lender’s death.371 The unpublished decision of Sable v. Velez372
involved two married couples, each seeking to qualify for Medicaid benefits to
pay for long-term care.373 One couple purchased two promissory notes from
their son: one for $80,903 and the other for $42,500.374 The notes were payable
at an interest rate between three and six percent, payable in seven years, and the
loan was made to the son without a credit check or secure collateral. 375
Similarly, the other couple made promissory notes to each of their three children
for $80,000, repayable with interest in monthly installments spread over four
years.376 Subsequently, both couples were denied Medicaid benefits because the
state agency “considered the promissory notes to be trust-like devices, requiring
367. See generally Lopes, 696 F.3d at 184, 186 (stating the question of “whether [an] annuity
is non-assignable” and whether it is “income or a resource” and stating that it is likely that “the
payment stream from [the] non-assignable annuity [in the case] is income”).
368. Id. at 187‒88. The court gave the Department of Health and Human Services a strong
degree of deference in informing its decision. Id.
369. Id. at 188. See also Brief for the Amicus Curiae, supra note 359 at 10‒11, 18.
370. See supra note 366 and accompanying text.
371. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(I) (2012). The provision states:
For purposes of this paragraph with respect to transfer of assets, the term ‘assets’ includes
funds used to purchase a promissory note, loan, or mortgage unless such note, loan, or
mortgage—(i) has a repayment term that is actuarially sound (as determined in
accordance with actuarial publications of the Office of the Chief Actuary of the Social
Security Administration); (ii) provides for payments to be made in equal amounts during
the term of the loan, with no deferral and no balloon payments made; and (iii) prohibits
the cancellation of the balance upon the death of the lender. In the case of a promissory
note, loan, or mortgage that does not satisfy the requirements of clauses (i) through (iii),
the value of such note, loan, or mortgage shall be the outstanding balance due as of the
date of the individual’s application for medical assistance for services described in
subparagraph (C).
Id. § 1396p(c)(1)(I).
372. 437 F. App’x 73, 76 (3d Cir. 2011).
373. Id. at 74‒75.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 75.

2015]

Selective Issues in Effective Medicaid Estate Recovery Statutes

73

the[ir] inclusion in [the applicant’s] countable resources for Medicaid
eligibility.”377
The couples appealed the adverse rulings by the state Medicaid official, but
“the District Court denied [their] motion for a preliminary injunction, finding
that the plaintiffs did not make an adequate showing of success on the merits
because a question existed as to whether a fiduciary relationship existed between
the parents and children as borrowers and lenders.”378 Subsequently, the district
court ruled that “the plaintiffs had failed to meet [their] burden of showing that
the notes were not the product of a bad-faith arrangement.”379 On appeal, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that two steps are required to
establish validity of the loans.380 The first inquiry is “whether the [promissory]
notes qualify under the regular SSI resource-counting rules as cash loans or
promissory notes [under] the [POMS].”381 If the notes do not qualify under
either category, then the second inquiry would be whether the notes are
considered trust-like devices pursuant to the POMS § 1120.201.382 To be a cash
loan, permitted under the Medicaid regulations, “the instrument must be a
‘negotiable, bona fide loan agreement.’”383 Furthermore, an informal loan may
qualify as bona fide if it meets the following conditions: “(1) it is enforceable
under state law, (2) was in effect at the time the cash proceeds were provided,
(3) there is an acknowledgement of an obligation to repay, (4) there is a plan for
repayment, and (5) the repayment plan is feasible.”384
The Third Circuit upheld the holding of the district court that the applicants
had failed to demonstrate that the promissory notes were bona fide.385 The court
stated, “[t]he lack of evidence of feasibility of repayment is sufficient, in itself,
to support a finding that plaintiffs’ notes likely fail the POMS test for a bona fide
loan agreement.” 386 The Third Circuit also agreed with the district court’s
finding that
(1) the loans were not arms-length transactions, (2) the loans were
informal between family members not in the business of lending money, (3)
that some of the children had power of attorney over their parents, (4)
the loans are not backed by collateral and there was no documentation
about the borrowers’ ability to repay the loans, (5) the timing of the
loans made prior to the filing of the applications was suspicious, and (6)
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 76.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id. (citing SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM (POMS) §
1120.220(C) (2015), https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0501120200).
385. Id.
386. Id.
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the loans were in the exact amount of excess resources preventing
Medicaid eligibility. 387
Even though POMS provides instructions to the Medicaid official to “assume,
absent evidence to the contrary, that the written agreement is bona fide and
negotiable,”388 there were sufficient facts to the contrary to demonstrate that the
loans were not bona fide.389
In addition to holding that the loans were not bona fide, the Third Circuit
affirmed that the holding of the district court that the notes executed between the
parents and the children were fiduciary in nature.390 That is, that the parents and
children did not meet their burden of “showing that it was more likely than not
that a fiduciary relationship did not exist between the parents and children.”391
The notes executed between the parties could be viewed as having an implicit
“understanding that the children would simply hold the money for the benefit of
the parents.” 392 Because trust-like devices must be considered as available
resources to applicants for Medicaid, these assets prevent the applicant from
qualifying for benefits.
V. STATUTORY RECOMMENDATION
Because Medicaid is a joint federal and state program, it is both
understandable and expected that issues pertaining to eligibility would be
resolved on a case-by-case basis among the various states. Such a practice is
endemic to federalism. But it is arguable that certain benefits describable as
essential to due process protection should be uniform throughout the states by
force of federal law. 393 Long-term care benefits are entitled to due process
protection. 394 Statistics confirm that an increasing number of citizens will
387. Id. at 76–77.
388. Id. at 77 (quoting PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM (POMS), supra note 384 at
§ 1140.300(D)(1) (2013), https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0501140300).
389. Id. For example, “the notes may have been entered into with the purpose of attaining
Medicaid eligibility, not to make loans.” Id.
390. Id.
391. Id. The court also cites Clyde v. Hodge, 460 F.2d 532, 535 (3d Cir. 1972) (stating that a
court must consider “surrounding facts and circumstances relevant to [each] case”) and United
Jersey Bank v. Kensey, 704 A.2d 38, 44 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (commenting that parties
can maintain a trust in one another because of their relationship to each other).
392. Sable, 437 F. App’x at 77.
393. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 48‒50 (1981) (holding that federal
regulations that permit states to “deem” income according to an arbitrary formula to impute a
spouse’s income are valid, but noting that such validity results from the broad authority of federal
officials to make intelligible the Byzantine Social Security Act).
394. See Jennifer L. Wright, Unconstitutional or Impossible: The Irreconcilable Gap Between
Managed Care and Due Process in Medicaid and Medicare, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
135, 160 (2000) (observing that “government entitlements have long been recognized as property
rights, requiring due process protection”). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970)
(stating that statutory entitlements for qualified persons are subject to some due process
protections).
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require long-term care and be unable to pay for institutional care, and few of
these will be aware of long-term care insurance and be unable to afford it when
payment is required. 395 Recipients of care are dependent upon the benefits
provided by Medicaid, and recipients’ spouses, minor or dependent children, and
extended families have grown complacent with assets coveted by estate recovery
efforts. 396 The necessity and reliance of long-term care benefits justifies an
immediate federal statutory structure to cure the disparities that have arisen
within the states pertaining to eligibility of long-term care.
Estate recovery and the three issues discussed in this Article illustrate the
disparity among the states. 397 First, by permitting states to elect a broader
definition of what constitutes the estate of the deceased individual, the state
permits one state to adopt a more expansive definition than the other, resulting
in disparity of benefits.398 This issue is augmented by state statutes that are
poorly drafted, thereby excluding assets that would be included for eligibility
purposes in other states.399 Second, the debate over the requirement that an asset
be available at the time of death of the Medicaid recipient seems reminiscent of
litigation over recovering the value of assets transferred by a spouse prior to
death.400
How may the state assist a surviving spouse to recover validly transferred
items of value, thereby decreasing the surviving spouse’s elective share? The
Uniform Probate Code proposed that any property over $12,000 in value that
was transferred to any single donee within two years of the donor’s death be
included within the elective share of the surviving spouse.401 The federal statute
or POMS regulations could implement a similar arrangement to lessen the
disparity of estate recovery applicable in one state and not in another because
one state is permitted to include transferred items under the auspices of the
transfer being an “other arrangement.”402 Finally, the transferability of annuities
receives disparate treatment among the states, resulting in denial of anticipated
benefits and depriving persons of reliable planning options.403
It is possible that recommendations could be made to each of the states to draft
their estate recovery statutes to accommodate the issues raised in this Article,
395. Andrew Melnyk & Harsh Sharma, Who Will Pay for Our Long-Term Care?, AM.
COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS 1‒2 (2014).
396. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing the surprise and dismay some
families may face when states attempt to engage in estate recovery).
397. See supra Parts II‒IV.
398. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (2012). See also supra Part II.
399. Compare Hines v. Dep’t of Pub. Aid, 850 N.E.2d 148, 152‒53 (Ill. 2006) (applying strict
construction of a poorly drafted statue), with In re Estate of Thompson, 586 N.W.2d 847, 850 (N.D.
1998) (utilizing an expansive approach to its state statute). See also supra Part II.
400. See supra Part III.
401. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-205(3)(C) (amended 2010). For commentary see O’Brien, supra
note 138, at 669–71.
402. See supra Part III (discussing the McCormick and Berg decisions).
403. See supra Part IV (analyzing spousal annuities).
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but this is not timely and would be injurious to the due process rights of persons
affected. A better approach would be to urge Congress to initiate changes to the
Medicaid law. First, the estate of the recipient must include all property owned
by the decedent at the time of his death, including probate, nonprobate, and
assets transferred inter vivos and not present at the time of death. Second,
annuities safeguard a comparable lifestyle for the non-institutionalized spouse,
and precise language should be enacted to preserve this option in spite of any
remote possibility of transferability. The amicus brief of HHS supports this
approach, but Congress must provide for this through statutory enactment or
regulations.404
VI. CONCLUSION
A number of factors combine to necessitate this Article. The greater longevity
of an increasing number of Americans precipitates economic pressure on federal
and state entitlement programs.405 One of these programs—Medicaid—offers
payment for long-term care, care that often costs thousands of dollars per
month.406 Because Medicaid is a joint federal-state effort, states must provide
at least some of the money to pay for these expenses, but they are limited in how
they may determine an applicant’s eligibility and how they may recover from an
applicant’s estate upon the applicant’s death. 407 Time and practice have
established rules and procedures governing eligibility guidelines, but changes in
the manner of transferring property at death make estate recovery programs
tentative and inconsistent among the states.408
Inconsistency in providing benefits is not insignificant. For some persons
applying for eligibility, ignorance of the law may result in loss of benefits
because the applicant’s state may treat an annuity as an asset, whereas another
state will not. 409 Likewise, some persons may be successful in transferring
assets inter vivos and safeguarding those assets for posterity; others may have
assets taken for expenditures made long after the long-term care recipient’s
death. 410 Furthermore, because of the significance of these benefits to an

404. See Brief for the Amicus Curiae, supra note 359, at 16, 18.
405. See supra notes 1‒8 and accompanying text.
406. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
407. Federal contributions to Medicaid expenditures may not be less than fifty percent in any
state and they may not exceed eighty-three percent. See EARL DIRK HOFFMAN, JR., BARBARA S.
KLEES & CATHERINE A. CURTIS, OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BRIEF SUMMARIES OF MEDICARE &
MEDICAID: TITLE XVIII AND TITLE XIX OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT AS OF NOVEMBER 1, 2008
23 (2008), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareProgramRatesStats/downloads/MedicareMedicaid
Summaries2008.pdf. See also MITCHELL & BAUMRUCKER, supra note 10, at 2 (indicating a
statutory maximum of eighty-three percent and statutory minimum of fifty percent).
408. See supra Part I. See also supra note 138 and accompanying text.
409. See supra Part IV.
410. See supra Part III.
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increasing number of persons, issues of due process arise. 411 This Article
recommends that Congress enacts legislation or implement regulations to
safeguard uniformity among the states as they provide long-term care benefits
to a rapidly growing segment of the population.

411. See supra notes 1‒8, 394 and accompanying text.
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